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Abstract
Title: Essays in Macroeconomics with Frictions and Uncertainty Shocks
C1. Financial Effects of Credit Constrained Workers’ Unemployment
C2. International Financial Business Cycles
C3. Uncertainty, Collateral Constrained Borrower, and the Business Cycle
Author: Taesu Kang
Advisor: Fabio Ghironi
This dissertation consists of three essays on macroeconomics with frictions and uncer-
tainty shocks.
The first essay is ”Collateral Constrained Workers’ Unemployment”. Financial market
and labor market are closely interconnected each other in the sense that unemployed
workers have difficulty not only in borrowing new loan but also in repaying outstanding
loan. In addition, if unemployment entails loss from default and no new loan, credit
constrained workers will accept lower wage to avoid the loss from losing job. In this
paper, we try to investigate the role of the interaction between financial market and
labor market over the business cycle. To do that, we assume credit constrained work-
ers can borrow against their houses and repay outstanding loans only when they are
employed. We also introduce labor search and matching framework into our model to
consider unemployment and wage bargaining process explicitly. With this setup, we
find that adverse housing preference shock leads to substantial negative impact on labor
market by reducing the benefit from maintaining job. As a result, high unemployment
significantly amplifies the business cycle by reducing supply of loan and increasing de-
fault. This result would be helpful to understand recent ”Great Recession” which was
originated from the collapse of housing market and accompanied by high unemployment
and default rate.
The second essay is ”International Financial Business Cycles”. Recent international
macroeconomics literature on global imbalances explains the U.S. persistent current
account deficit and emerging countries’ surplus, i.e., the U.S. is the borrower. Little re-
search has been done on the banking-sector level, where U.S. banks are lenders to banks
in emerging countries. We build a two country framework where banks are explicitly
modeled to investigate how lending in the banking sector can affect the international
macroeconomy during the recent crisis. In steady state, banks in the developing coun-
try borrows from the U.S. banks. When the borrowers in the U.S. pay back less than
contractually agreed and damage the balance sheet of the U.S. banks, with the presence
of bank capital requirement constraint, U.S. banks raise lending rates and decrease the
loans made to U.S. borrowers as well as banks in the developing country. The results
are a sharp increase in the lending spread, a reduction in output and a depreciation
in the real exchange rate of the developing country. They are the experience of many
emerging Asian markets following the U.S. financial crisis starting in late 2007. Another
feature of our model captures an empirical fact, documented by Devereux and Yetman
(2010), that across different economies, countries with lower financial rating can suffer
more when the lending country deleverages.
The third essay is ”Uncertainty, Collateral Constrained Borrowers, and Business Cycle”.
Standard RBC model fails to generate the co-movement of key macro variables under
uncertainty shock because precautionary saving motive decreases consumption but in-
creases investment and labor. To fill this gap, we build a DSGE model with collateral
constrained borrowers who can borrow against housing and capital. In the model with
modest risk aversion, we can generate the desired co-movement of key macro variables
under uncertainty shock and the co-movement comes from the collateral constraint chan-
nel through drop in housing price. Under uncertainty shock, highly indebted borrowers
sell collaterals to avoid uncertainty in future consumption. As a result, housing price
goes down and it makes credit crunch to borrowers through collateral constraint chan-
nel. The negative effect of uncertainty shock is strengthened in the economy with higher
indebted borrowers.
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1.1 Introduction
Financial market and labor market are not independent but highly interconnected
each other. Why? First, financial intermediaries are reluctant to extend loans for
unemployed workers since the unemployed have difficulty in repaying outstanding loan.
For example, Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the largest mortgage insurer in the
world, requires at least two years steady employment history and less than 30 percent
of Debt-to-Income (DTI) ratio3 to be qualified for its mortgage insurance4. Second,
unemployment as well as deep negative equity of house has been considered as one
of main triggers of mortgage default during recent ”Great Recession”. Foote et al.
(2009) [19] argues that 1 percentage point increase in unemployment rate raises the
probability of a 90-day-delinquency by 10-20 percent. Elul et al. (2010) [15] also finds
that county-level unemployment shocks are associated with higher default rate. Third,
workers consider the financial effects of unemployment when they are in wage bargaining
process. In other words, credit constrained workers know that they could not borrow
or would go default if they lost job. If there is penalty from default or benefit from
borrowing, credit constrained workers would accept lower wage to avoid the loss from
losing job. On the contrary, decrease of penalty from default or benefit from borrowing
would discourage credit constrained workers from maintaining job. Ellingsen and Holden
(2002) [13] argues that indebted workers are more willing to accept a low wage in order
to reduce the probability of unemployment.
Table 1.1: Correlations between Key Variables
House Price GDP Unemp. Rate Mortg. Loan Delinq. Rate
House Price 1.0000 0.6590 -0.5448 0.5072 -0.5866
GDP 0.6590 1.0000 -0.8222 0.3705 -0.7051
Unemp. Rate -0.5448 -0.8222 1.0000 -0.4866 0.7465
Mortg. Loan 0.5072 0.3705 -0.4866 1.0000 -0.3454
Delinq. Rate -0.5866 -0.7051 0.7465 -0.3454 1.0000
We could see the interaction between financial market and labor market indirectly by
3The ratio of monthly mortgage-related (or all debt) payments to monthly gross income.
4Unemployment does not necessarily imply no mortgage loan. The unemployed could get
mortgage loan from risk taking financial intermediaries especially during housing boom if they
pay high premium.
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investigate empirical characteristics of related data. <Figure 1.1> shows the trends of
key variables of housing, labor, and financial market. House price5 started to stagnate
from 2006:I and then fall by around 30% during the 2007-2009. Unemployment rate
and delinquency rate dramatically rose from 4.5% and 2% respectively to around 10%
both during the same period. Outstanding mortgage loan hit the peak in April 2008,
which was 2 years later than the house price did, and thereafter has been decreasing
(around 7% drop from the peak by 2011:II). Interestingly, all those variables are still
much far from the pre-crisis levels even long after the official end of the recession (June
2009). <Figure 1.2> presents the trends of growth rates of gdp, consumption, and
investment. The key macro variables also sharply fell during the recession but had
been recovered to the pre-crisis levels, at least almost, by 2011:II. <Table 1.1> shows
correlations over the business cycles among key variables. We detrended all variables
by using Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract business cycle components from the time
series with trends6. During 1987:I7 - 2011:II, unemployment rate is positively correlated
with default rate (0.75) but negatively correlated with outstanding mortgage loan (-
0.498). We admit high correlation does not directly imply the connection between two
variables. In addition, robust empirical exercise to see whether unemployment is an
important factor to affect default and the size of outstanding loan is beyond the scope
of this paper but in this paper we try to investigate the role of the interaction between
financial market and labor market, if there exists, within our theoretical model and
we will see if the theoretical model can generate the comovements among key variables
better during the Great Recession.
To consider the interaction in a theoretical DSGE framework, we borrow basic setup
from Iacovillo (2011) [30] and change the model in three directions: First, we assume
collateral constrained workers can borrow only when they are employed. Second, we also
assume indebted workers went default if they lost job. Third, to consider unemployment
explicitly in the model, we introduce job search and matching framework into our model.
Now credit constrained workers will consider the financial effects of unemployment,
5House price and outstanding mortgage loan are indexed to 100 in 1999:IV
6Unemployment rate and default rate have unit-root in the level.
7We can get delinquency rate data just from 1987:I.
8If we focused on the period of Great Recession, correlation became much larger.
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Figure 1.1: Trends of Key Variables
Figure 1.2: Trends of Growth Rates of GDP, Consumption, and Investment
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default and no more loan, when they bargain with firms for wage bill. Iacoviello (2011)
[30] has many merits to investigate the interaction under adverse housing preference
shock since it has credit constrained workers, housing market, and most of all capital
requirement constrained banking sector which is crucial to identify the role of default.
Under adverse housing preference shock, the baseline model without the interaction
shows that lowered housing price suppresses investment, labor, and output through
the conventional collateral constraint channel. By introducing the interaction into the
baseline model, we find that the negative effect of adverse housing preference shock is
significantly amplified through the interaction channel. First, credit constrained workers
would require higher wage bill to work since the surplus from borrowing and the penalty
from defaulting decrease under adverse housing preference shock. It implies that credit
constrained workers’ unemployment increases more than before. Second, the number
of workers who can borrow decreases so total loan to workers diminishes. Third, the
number of default increases and it undermines the loan making ability of banking sector
for both entrepreneurs and workers through capital requirement constraint. As a result,
investment and output fall more when we consider the interaction. Furthermore, we
find that each channel, default channel and no more loan channel, plays an independent
and important role under the shock.
Our paper is linked to three strands of literatures. First, our work is related to
literatures on the role of financial friction over labor market. Acemoglu (2001) [1]
argues that the change in technologies have a persistent adverse effect on unemployment
in a country with inefficient financial market since agents who need cash to start a
new business cannot borrow necessary funds. Chugh (2009) [10] studies the interaction
between financial friction and labor friction by introducing external finance premium
into a standard search and matching model. He finds that aggregate TFP shock leads
to large labor market fluctuations if the external finance premium is counter-cyclical.
Those two papers focus on demand side of labor market in which firms (or entrepreneurs)
face financial friction but we are interested in supply side in which credit constrained
workers interacts with financial market. In our model, financial market condition directly
affects workers’ decision in wage bargaining process and the workers’ decision in labor
5
market also directly change financial market condition through the changes in default
rate and aggregate loan size.
Second, our paper is connected to literatures on default. Forlati and Lambertini
(2011) [20] investigates the role of uncertainty in idiosyncratic housing price and ar-
gues that uncertainty increase in idiosyncratic housing price can lead credit crunch by
increasing expected default and interest rate. Iacoviello (2011) [30] considers banking
sector with capital requirement constraint and shows that exogenous repayment shock9
from collateral constrained borrowers could generate credit crunch by reducing the loan
making ability of banking sector through the bankers’ capital requirement constraint.
In Goodhart et al. (2009) [26], liquidity constrained agents can choose how much frac-
tion of outstanding debt will be repaid10. They argue that a model without default
cannot predict the negative effects of technological shocks on financial stability in the
short run. Our model is different from those default models in the sense that default
is endogenously determined by job status but not by idiosyncratic housing price shock,
borrowers’ strategic choice, or pure exogenous shock.
Third, our paper is associated with recent debates on the shift of the Beveridge Curve
after the end of Great Recession. A Beveridge curve presents the inverse relationship
between unemployment rate and job vacancy rate. After the end of the recession, job
vacancy rate has risen by about 20% but unemploymnet rate has remained almost
steady at very high level. Did Beveridge curve shift after the recession? Kocherlakota
(2010) [35] argues that the mismatch in geography, skills, and demography is the main
source of the change in the relationship between job vacancies rate and unemployment
rate. Sahin et al. (2012) [44] empirically shows that the mismatch across industries
and occupations accounts for 0.6 to 1.7 percentage points of the recent rise in the U.S.
unemployment rate, whereas geographical mismatch plays no role. On the contrary,
Elsby et al. (2011) [14] argues that the lackluster labor market recovery can be traced
in large part to weakness in aggregate demand; only a small part seems attributable to
increases in labor market frictions. Furlanetto and Groshenny (2011) [21] also shows that
the current very high rate of unemployment reflects not change in matching efficiency but
9Pay back less than contractually agreed.
10strategic default.
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insufficient aggregate demand, mainly caused by adverse financial factors and nominal
rigidities. In this paper, we try to suggest another answer to the question from the
supply side of labor. Lackluster housing demand and credit crunch in financial market
might discourage credit constrained workers from maintaining or seeking job.
We would like to acknowledge Giovannini and Santoro (2011) [25] as an indepen-
dent work from ours. Although research motivations and some modeling assumptions
are different each other, a key assumption is very similar. They also consider a real
business cycle model with labor friction and credit market friction in which borrowing
is conditional on employment status. Our model might be different from theirs in that
we have additional default channel of unemployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple Un-
ristricted Vector Autoregression (VARs) model to see the empirical impulse responses
of key variables to house price shock. In section 3, we present the DSGE model con-
sidering the interaction between financial market and labor market. In section 4, we
describe wage bargaining process where credit constrained workers consider financial
channels of unemployment. Section 5 reports calibration of parameters and theoretical
impulse responses to adverse housing preference shock. Section 6 is concluding remarks.
An appendix provides some additional details.
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1.2 Unrestricted VARs Model
Before describing the model with housing preference shock and the interaction be-
tween financial market and labor market, let’s see first what data tells us. Granger-
Causality tests and unrestricted VARs analysis is useful to document the key relation-
ships in data and to compare the data to the model we will present in following sections.
Table 1.2: VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests
Dependent variable: House Price
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
GDP 4.78666 2 0.0913
UNEMP RATE 1.54639 2 0.4615
DELINQ RATE 1.35616 2 0.5076
All 8.81134 6 0.1845
Dependent variable: GDP
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
HOUSE PRICE 12.71037 2 0.0017
UNEMP RATE 1.24805 2 0.5358
DELINQ RATE 5.41655 2 0.0667
All 21.28491 6 0.0016
Dependent variable: UNEMP RATE
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
HOUSE PRICE 8.66305 2 0.0131
GDP 21.43708 2 0.0000
DELINQ RATE 16.62359 2 0.0002
All 80.15348 6 0.0000
Dependent variable: DELINQ RATE
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
HOUSE PRICE 8.79092 2 0.0123
GDP 0.70285 2 0.7037
UNEMP RATE 11.78717 2 0.0028
All 24.38718 6 0.0004
Our sample consists of quarterly data of housing price, gdp, unemployment rate, and
delinquency rate from 1987:I to 2011:II. In the sample, all variables, even unemployment
rate and delinquency rate, cannot reject the null hypothesis, having unit root, in level. So
we need to detrend the variables to get stable time series. To do that, we take logarithm
of housing price and gdp, and detrended all variables by using Hodrick-Prescott filter11
to extract business cycle components. All detrended data passed Augmented Dickey-
11Change in log of housing price and outstanding mortgage loan have unit-root.
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Fuller unit-root test at 1% significance level12.
<Table 1.2> presents the result of Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests.
Housing price Granger-cause gdp (at 1% significance levle), unemployment rate and
delinquency rate (at 5% significance level). Other variables, however, Granger non-
cause housing price even jointly. Unemployment rate and default rate Granger-cause
each other at 1% significance level but Granger non-cause housing price and gdp. GDP
Granger-cause unemployment rate also at 1% significance level.
Based on our purpose of analysis, the unrestricted VARs model is ordered13 1) hous-
ing price, 2) gdp, 3) unemployment rate, and 4) delinquency rate. We choose 2 lag
length according to Schwartz Information Criterion. <Figure 1.3> shows generalized
impulse responses of variables to one standard deviation innovations. The generalized
impulse responses seem to be consistent with our intuition. Housing price shock has
positive effect on gdp but negative on unemployment rate and default rate. Unemploy-
ment rate innovation leads increase in default rate during 5 quarters. We will describe
theoretical model in next section.
Figure 1.3: Impulse Responses to One Standard Deviation Innovation of Housing Price
12Outstanding mortgage loan cannot pass the test even at 10% significance level so we remove
it from Granger-Causality test and unrestricted VARs analysis.
13Granger non-causality is not necessary or sufficient condition for the exogeneity of a variable.
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1.3 The Model
Our model is based on Iacoviello (2011) [30]. We will introduce labor market friction
and financial channels of unemployment into the basic model. For labor market friction,
we refer to Hertweck (2010) [28]. We have 5 agents in the model: patient households,
subprimers, entrepreneurs, bankers, and firms. We will use subscript p, s, e, and b for
patient households, subprimers, entrepreneurs, and bankers respectively.
1.3.1 Labor Market Friction
To consider unemployment explicitly, we introduce job search and matching model14
of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) [37]. In the job search and matching model, it’s costly
for workers and firms to be matched and wages are determined by bilateral bargaining.
For simplicity, let’s normalize the number of workers be equal to 1. If nt denote the
number of employed workers, 1 − nt would be the number of unemployed workers. In
a standard job search and matching model, firms try to fill their vacant positions by
posting job opportunity, vt, and unemployed workers, 1 − nt, try to find job by paying
constant search cost, e. The number of meetings between firms and unemployed workers
is determined by the exogenously given Cobb-Douglas type matching function as follows:
mt(vt, 1− nt) = ηv
θ
t [e(1− nt)]
1−θ
where η is matching technology and constant. Matching function, mt(·), is generally
assumed to be continuous, non-negative, increasing in both arguments and concave. By
matching function, it takes time for firms and the unemployed to meet.
For convenience, let’s define labor market tightness, γt, as follows:
γt =
vt
1− nt
.
Then, we can define vacancy filling rate, q(γt), and job finding rate, f(γt), as a function
14Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2004) [43] well surveys the job search and matching theory.
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of the market tightness:
q(γt) ≡
mt
vt
= ηe1−θγθ−1t ,
f(γt) ≡
mt
1− nt
= ηe1−θγθt .
As standard job search and matching model does, we assume that vacancy filling rate
is given for individual firm and job finding rate is given for individual worker. In other
words, individual firms and workers are small enough not to change the market vacancy
filling rate and job finding rate respectively.
Now we can rewrite the matching function as a function of vacancy filling rate or
job finding rate as follows:
mt = q(γt)vt,
mt = f(γt)(1− nt).
If we assume job separation rate, ϕ, is constant, the law of motion for the the number
of employed workers is given by:
nt+1 = (1− ϕ)nt +mt,
= (1− ϕ)nt + q(γt)vt,
= (1− ϕ)nt + f(γt)(1 − nt).
Finally, for simplicity, we assume there are two different labor markets for patient
households and subprimers respectively15.
1.3.2 Patient Households
Let’s normalize the number of patient households to 1. If np,t denote the share of
the employed among patient households, 1 − np,t would be unemployment rate of pa-
15Patient workers and impatient workers (subprimers) have no difference in their skills. Fur-
thermore, although they have different financial positions, firms don’t know whether an indi-
vidual worker belongs to patient group or not. So patient workers and impatient workers are
perfectly substitutable in real world.
11
tient households. Patient households have logarithmic utility function over consumption
goods, cp,t, housing, hp,t, and leisure when they are employed, 1 − lp,t. If they are un-
employed, they have to pay constant job search cost e. When they are employed, they
supply labor, lp,t, to firms for real wage, wp,t. They save, bp,t, to bankers at interest rate,
Rp,t. For simplicity, we assume patient households do not accumulate capital, which is
some deviation from Iacoviello (2011)16 [30]. As a standard job search and matching
model does, we assume the family of patient households offers insurance against idiosyn-
cratic shocks for individual patient households. Because of the insurance, every patient
households enjoy same amount of consumption and housing regardless of individual
household’s job status.
Patient households solve following utility maximization problem:
max
cp,t,hp,t,bp,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtp [ln cp,t + jt lnhp,t + np,tτ ln(1− lp,t) + (1− np,t)τ ln(1− e)]
subject to cp,t + qt (hp,t − hp,t−1) + bp,t = Rp,t−1bp,t−1 + np,twp,tlp,t (1.1)
np,t+1 = (1− ϕ)np,t + f(γp,t)(1− np,t) (1.2)
where βp is discount factor of patient households, qt is housing price, τ is a parameter to
control relative preference for leisure. jt controls relative preference for housing against
consumption and has AR(1) process as follows:
ln jt = (1− ρj) ln j + ρj ln jt−1 + ǫj,t, ǫj,t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ
2
j ) (1.3)
where j is steady state value of jt and ρj is persistency parameter of the shock. ǫj,t
is i.i.d. stochastic error term. Equation (1.2) is the law of motion for the number of
the employed patient households. Individual patient household takes market job finding
rate, f(γp,t), and wage bill, wp,tlp,t, as given. The wage bill will be determined by
bilateral bargaining with firms.
16Iacoviello (2011) assumes both patient households and entrepreneurs accumulate capital for
production.
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Patient households’ first order conditions are given by:
qt
cp,t
=
jt
hp,t
+ βpEt
(
qt+1
cp,t+1
)
, (1.4)
1
cp,t
= βpEt
(
Rp,t
cp,t+1
)
. (1.5)
By the Envelope theorem, we can find patient households’ surplus from marginal
matching as follows:
W1(np,t) =
1
cp,t
wp,tlp,t + (1− ϕ)βpEtW1(np,t+1)
− [τ ln(1− e)− τ ln(1− lp,t) + f(γp,t)βpEtW1(np,t+1)]
where W1(np,t) is the first differential of patient households’ value function, W (np,t)
with respect to np,t and denotes patient households’ surplus from marginal matching.
The surplus from marginal matching is the difference between the value of employment,
which is the sum of utility from wage bill and expected present value of future matching,
and the value of unemployment, which is the sum of utility from leisure and expected
present value of future matching.
1.3.3 Subprimers
Let’s normalize the number of subprimers to 1. If ns,t denotes the share of the
employed among subprimers, 1− ns,t would be unemployment rate of subprimers. Sub-
primers also have logarithmic utility function over consumption goods, cs,t, housing, hs,t,
and leisure when they are employed, 1− ls,t. They have to pay job searching cost e when
they are unemployed. They supply labor, ls,t, to firms for real wage, ws,t, when they
are employed. In contrast to patient households, they borrow, bs,t, at interest rate, Rs,t
from bankers. Subprimers are collateral constrained so the amount of loan is determined
by some fraction of expected future value of their own housing. Subprimers family also
offers insurance against idiosyncratic shock for individual subprimers so all subprimers
enjoy same amount of consumption and housing regardless of individual subprimer’s job
status.
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To consider financial channels of unemployment, we add two more assumptions.
First, subprimers can borrow only when they are employed. Therefore, the total amount
of loan depends on employment rate as well as the expected future value of collateral.
If unemployment rate increases, total amount of loan which subprimers can borrow
decreases. Second, the family insurance does not cover the loan repayment of the unem-
ployed. So unemployed subprimers with outstanding loan go default. If they go default,
they don’t need to repay outstanding loan but lose the collateral regardless of its value.
Since subprimers lose collateral even with positive equity by going default, subprimers
have incentive to avoid unemployment when they have debt.
Subprimers solve following utility maximization problem:
max
cs,t,hs,t,bs,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts [ln cs,t + jt lnhs,t + ns,tτ ln(1− ls,t) + (1− ns,t)τ ln(1− e)]
subject to cs,t + qt (hs,t − hs,t−1) +
[
nφs,t + (1− n
φ
s,t)
1
ms
qt
qet
]
Rs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1
= nχs,tbs,t + ns,tws,tls,t + tt (1.6)
Rs,tbs,t ≤ msEt (qt+1hs,t) (1.7)
ns,t+1 = (1− ϕ)ns,t + f(γs,t)(1− ns,t) (1.8)
where βs is discount factor of subprimers, ms is Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio against
housing, and qet = Et−1(qt). An individual subprimer takes market job finding rate,
q(γs,t), and wage bill, ws,tls,t, as given. Equation (1.8) is the law of motion for the
number of the employed subprimers.
χ and φ controls the financial channels of unemployment. If χ = 0, job status does
not affect borrowing so even unemployed can borrow. If φ = 0, job status does not affect
repayment of debt so even unemployed pay back all outstanding debt. When χ = φ = 0,
our model would be reduced to Iacoviello (2011) [30] with just unemployment. tt is lump
sum transfer from bankers. We assume bankers pay recovery cost, ω, to sell foreclosed
collateral and subprimers receive the recovery cost in lump sum from bankers.
Equation (1.7) captures the idea of collateral constraint. Individual debt repayment,
Rs,tbs,t, at next period should be less (0 < ms < 1) than the expected next period value
of housing, Et (qt+1hs,t).
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Subprimers’ first order conditions are given by:
qt
cs,t
=
jt
hs,t
+ λs,tmsEt (qt+1) + βsEt
(
qt+1
cs,t+1
)
, (1.9)
1
cs,t
= λs,t
Rs,t
nχs,t
+ βiEt
{
1
cs,t+1
[
nφs,t+1 + (1− n
φ
s,t+1)
1
ms
]
Rs,t
}
, (1.10)
where λs,t is a Lagrangian multiplier for collateral constraint.
By the Envelope theorem, we can find subprimers’ surplus from marginal matching
as follows:
W1(ns,t) =
1
cs,t
ws,tls,t + (1− ϕ)βsEtWt(ns,t+1)
− [τ ln(1− e)− τ ln(1− ls,t) + f(γs,t)βsEtW1(ns,t+1)]
+
1
cs,t
[
χnχ−1s,t bs,t + φn
φ−1
s,t
(
1
ms
qt
qet
− 1
)
Rs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1
]
− βsEt
{
1
cs,t+1
[
nφs,t+1 + (1− n
φ
s,t+1)
1
ms
]
Rs,tbs,tχn
χ−1
s,t
}
whereW1(ns,t) is the first differential of subprimers’ value function,W (ns,t), with respect
to ns,t and denotes subprimers’ surplus from marginal matching. Subprimers’ surplus
from marginal matching is also the difference between the value of employment and the
value of unemployment. Interestingly, subprimers’ value of employment has additional
term, the surplus from marginal borrowing. If a subprimer could get job, it could borrow
and save house if it has outstanding loan. That’s the gain from marginal borrowing.
In next period, it should repay outstanding loan if it would not be separated from the
job or it would lose housing if it would lose the job. That’s the cost from marginal
borrowing. The additional term comes from the financial channels of unemployment we
assume. It implies that institutional setup of financial market could affect labor market.
When χ = φ = 0, the surplus from marginal borrowing disappears.
1.3.4 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have preferences over only consumption goods, ce,t. They do not
work but accumulate capital, kt, and housing, he,t, for rental profit r
k
t and qtr
h
t respec-
tively. Entrepreneurs also borrow, be,t, from bankers at interest rate, Re,t, and they are
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collateral constrained against their own housing and capital.
Entrepreneurs solve following utility maximization problem:
max
ce,t,he,t,ke,t,be,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βte (ln ce,t)
subject to ce,t + qt (he,t − he,t−1) + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 +Re,tbe,t−1
= be,t + r
k
t kt−1 + r
h
t qthe,t−1, (1.11)
Re,tbe,t ≤ m
k
ekt +m
h
eEt (qt+1he,t) , (1.12)
where βe is discount factor of entrepreneurs, m
k
e and m
h
e are LTV ratios against capital
and housing respectively, and δ is depreciation rate for capital.
Equation (1.12) captures the idea of collateral constraint which entrepreneurs face.
Total repayment of debt, Re,tbe,t, at next period should be less (0 < m
k
e ,m
h
e < 1) than
the expected next period value of collaterals, Et (qt+1he,t) + kt.
Entrepreneurs’ first order conditions are given by:
1
ce,t
= λe,tm
k
e + βeEt
[
1
ce,t+1
(
rkt+1 + 1− δ
)]
, (1.13)
qt
ce,t
= λe,tm
h
eEt (qt+1) + βeEt
(
qt+1
ce,t+1
)
, (1.14)
1
ce,t
= λe,tRe,t + βeEt
(
Re,t+1
ce,t+1
)
, (1.15)
where λe,t is a Lagrangian multiplier for collateral constraint.
1.3.5 Bankers
Bankers have preferences over only consumption goods, cb,t. They do not work but
make profit by receiving deposit from patient households and making loan to subprimers
and entrepreneurs. Bankers are constrained by capital adequacy regulation17. They also
face recovery cost, 0 < ω < 1, to sell foreclosed collateral.
17The Basel Accords (Basel II), published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
housed at the Bank for International Settlements, requires that the percentage of a bank’s capital
to risk-weighted assets must be no lower than 8%.
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Bankers solve following utility maximization problem:
max
cb,t,bp,t,bs,t,be,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb (ln cb,t)
subject to cb,t +Rp,t−1bp,t−1 + n
χ
s,tbs,t + be,t
= bp,t +
[
nφs,t + (1− ω)(1− n
φ
s,t)
1
ms
qt
qet
]
Rs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1 +Re,tbe,t−1,
(1.16)
bp,t ≤ γebe,t + γsn
χ
s,tbs,t, (1.17)
where βb is discount factor of bankers.
Equation (1.17) captures the idea of capital adequacy regulation. Deposit, bp,t,
should be less than some fraction, 0 < γe, γs < 1, of total assets, be,t + n
χ
s,tbs,t. In other
words, bankers should accumulate its own capital to extend loan. γe and γs control
riskiness of loans to subprimers and entrepreneurs respectively.
Bankers’ first order conditions are given by:
1
cb,t
= λb,t + βbEt
(
Rp,t
cb,t+1
)
, (1.18)
1
cb,t
= λb,tγs + βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[
nφs,t+1 + (1− ω)(1 − n
φ
s,t+1)
1
ms
]
Rs,t
}
, (1.19)
1
cb,t
= λb,tγe + βbEt
(
Re,t+1
cb,t+1
)
, (1.20)
where λb,t is a Lagrangian multiplier for capital adequacy constraint.
In steady state, if there is no default (i.e., φ = 0), loan rate for subprimers is equal
to that for entrepreneurs. Although φ 6= 0, two loan rates become same if 1 − ω = ms.
The recovery cost gives us some intuition for Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio. By setting
ms ≤ 1−ω, bankers could avoid loss from default at least in steady state. By assumption,
the recovery cost is transferred to subprimers in lump sump.
1.3.6 Firms
Firms are perfectly competitive in goods market. They use capital, kt, labor,
np,tlp,t, ns,tls,t, and housing, he,t, as inputs to produce consumption goods, yt, and pay
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rkt , r
h
t qt, wp,t, ws,t for the use of inputs respectively. We assume firms face quadratic
labor adjustment cost18 and firms’ production technology is Cobb-Douglass. To nor-
malize the number of patient households and subprimers to 1 each, we assume labors
of patient households and subprimers are complements instead of perfect substitutes.19
We will control the relative size of each type of workers by σ in production function.
As standard job search and matching model does, we also assume that firms are large
enough to eliminate all uncertainty in np,t+1 and ns,t+1 but small enough to take market
vacancy filling rates and wage bills as given.
A representative firm choose kt−1, he,t−1, vp,t, vs,t, np,t+1, and ns,t+1 to solve following
profit maximization problem:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
[
yt −
(
rkt kt−1 + r
h
t qthe,t−1 + np,twp,tlp,t + ns,tws,tls,t +
κ
2
m2p,t
np,t
+
κ
2
m2s,t
ns,t
)]
subject to yt = ztk
µ
t−1h
ν
e,t−1
[
(np,tlp,t)
1−σ (ns,tls,t)
σ
]1−µ−ν
(1.21)
np,t+1 = (1− ϕ)np,t + q(γp,t)vp,t
ns,t+1 = (1− ϕ)ns,t + q(γs,t)vs,t
where µ, ν, and 1−µ−ν denote capital, housing, and labor share of output respectively.
Patient households take 1 − σ and subprimers take σ from the labor share of output,
1 − µ − ν. So we can say that higher σ implies higher share of subprimers in total
households. zt is exogenous technology shock and has AR(1) process as follows:
ln zt = (1− ρz) ln z + ρz ln zt−1 + ǫz,t, ǫz,t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ
2
z ) (1.22)
where z is steady state value of zt and ρz is a persistency parameter of the shock. ǫz,t
is i.i.d. stochastic error term.
18Hertweck (2010) [28] use κ
2
m
2
t
nt
for the labor adjustment cost instead of standard κvt. In this
setup, firms’ labor adjustment cost is determined by the number of filled position instead of the
number of posted position.
19We could use yt = ztk
µ
t−1h
ν
e,t−1 [(1 − σ)np,tlp,t + σns,tls,t]
1−µ−ν as a production technology.
In that case, we should keep track of relative size of patient households and subprimers.
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For convenience, let’s define the gross hiring rate xp,t and xs,t as follows:
xp,t =
mp,t
np,t
, (1.23)
xs,t =
ms,t
ns,t
. (1.24)
A representative firm’s first order conditions are given by:
µ
yt
kt−1
= rkt , (1.25)
ν
yt
he,t−1
= rht qt, (1.26)
κxp,t = βeEt
{
Λe,t
[
(1− σ)(1− µ− ν)
yt+1
np,t+1
− wp,t+1lp,t+1 +
κ
2
x2p,t+1 + κxp,t+1(1− ϕ)
]}
,
(1.27)
κxs,t = βeEt
{
Λe,t
[
σ(1− µ− ν)
yt+1
ns,t+1
− ws,t+1ls,t+1 +
κ
2
x2s,t+1 + κxs,t+1(1− ϕ)
]}
,
(1.28)
where Λe,t = ce,t/ce,t+1.
By the Envelope theorem, we can derive firms’ surplus from marginal matching for
each type of workers as follows:
V1(np,t) = (1− σ)(1 − µ− ν)
yt
np,t
− wp,tlp,t +
κ
2
x2p,t + (1− ϕ)βeEt [Λe,tV1(np,t+1)] ,
(1.29)
V2(ns,t) = σ(1− µ− ν)
yt
ns,t
− ws,tls,t +
κ
2
x2s,t + (1− ϕ)βeEt [Λe,tV2(ns,t+1)] ,
(1.30)
where V1(np,t) and V2(ns,t) are the first differentials of firms’ value function V (np,t, ns,t)
with respect to np,t and ns,t respectively and denote the surplus of marginal matching
for each type of workers. From additional matching, firms can produce more and save
labor adjustment cost but have to pay wage bill.
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1.3.7 Market Clearing Conditions
We assume supply of housing is fixed and normalized to 1. Thus, housing market
clearing condition will be:
hp,t + hs,t + he,t = 1. (1.31)
Aggregate resource constraint is as follows:
yt = cp,t + cs,t + ce,t + cb,t + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 +
κ
2
m2p,t
np,t
+
κ
2
m2s,t
ns,t
.
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1.4 Wage Bargaining
1.4.1 Optimal Wage Bill
In standard job search and matching model, optimal wage bill is generally deter-
mined by solving the Nash bargaining problem. Nash (1950) [33] shows that there is
unique solution to a bargaining problem if the problem satisfies following 4 axioms: (i)
Invariance to Equivalent Utility Representations, (ii) Symmetry20, (iii) Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives, and (iv) Pareto Efficiency.
We have to solve the following Nash bargaining problems to get optimal wage bills
for patient households and subprimers:
wp,tlp,t = arg max
wp,tlp,t
[cp,tW1(np,t)]
1−ξ V1(np,t)
ξ ,
ws,tls,t = arg max
wp,tlp,t
[cs,tW1(ns,t)]
1−ξ V2(ns,t)
ξ,
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the firms’ bargaining power. The solutions to the maximization
problems satisfy
(1− ξ)V1(np,t) = ξcp,tW1(np,t), (1.32)
(1− ξ)V1(np,t) = ξcp,tW1(np,t). (1.33)
From the equation (1.32) and (1.33), we can find optimal wage bills for patient
households and subprimers.
wp,tlp,t =(1− ξ)
[
(1− σ)(1 − µ− ν)
yt
np,t
+
κ
2
x2p,t
]
− ξcp,t [τ ln(1− lp,t)− τ ln(1− e)]
+ (1− ξ)(1− ϕ)βeEt [Λe,tV1(np,t+1)]− ξcp,tβpEt {W1(np,t+1) [(1− ϕ)− f(γp,t)]} ,
(1.34)
20Nash (1950) assumes two players have same bargaining power, i.e., ξ = 1/2. If we drop (ii)
symmetry axiom, i.e., assume ξ ∈ (0, 1), we can show there is unique solution satisfying other 3
axioms. See Orsborne and Rubinstein (1990) [39] for details.
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ws,tls,t =(1− ξ)
[
σ(1− µ− ν)
yt
ns,t
+
κ
2
x2s,t
]
− ξcs,t [τ ln(1− ls,t)− τ ln(1− e)]
+ (1− ξ)(1− ϕ)βeEt [Λe,tV2(ns,t+1)]− ξcs,tβsEt {W1(ns,t+1) [(1− ϕ)− f(γs,t)]}
− ξ
[
χnχ−1s,t bs,t + φn
φ−1
s,t
(
1
ms
qt
qet
− 1
)
Rs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1
]
+ ξ
{
βsEt
{
Λs,t
[
nφs,t+1 + (1− n
φ
s,t+1)
1
ms
]
Rs,tbs,tχn
χ−1
s,t
}}
, (1.35)
where Λs,t = cs,t/cs,t+1. Optimal wage bills have positive relationship with marginal
productivity of labor and the value of leisure. The patient households’ optimal wage
bill is standard. However, subprimers’ optimal wage bill has additional terms, which are
related to the financial channels of unemployment. Subprimers’ optimal wage bill has
negative relationship with the surplus from borrowing. If the surplus from borrowing is
positive, it implies that subprimers would accept lower wage bill to access to financial
market and avoid default. Again when χ = φ = 0, the subprimers’ optimal wage bill is
not affected by the status in financial market.
1.4.2 Optimal Labor Effort
Standard job search and matching model generally assumes fixed labor effort. In that
case, the wage bargaining process can pin down the wage. In our model, however, labor
effort is time varying so the wage bargaining process just determines the multiplication
of wage and labor effort but not individual wage and labor effort. To determine wage
and labor effort, we assume firms and workers choose optimal labor effort to maximize
mutual surplus which is the sum of both parties’ surpluses from marginal matching.
Following Hertweck (2010) [28], if the marginal product of labor effort is given for both
parties, optimal labor efforts should satisfies following conditions:
(1− σ)(1 − µ− ν)
yt
np,tlp,t
= cp,tτ
1
1− lp,t
, (1.36)
σ(1− µ− ν)
yt
ns,tls,t
= cs,tτ
1
1− ls,t
. (1.37)
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Calibration
Since our model is based on Iacoviello (2011) [30], we basically follows the calibration
of it. <Table 1.3> lists calibrations for model parameters in detail.
Table 1.3: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
βp 0.9925 Discount factor of patient households
βs 0.9600 Discount factor of subprimers
βe 0.9600 Discount factor of entrepreneurs
βb 0.9650 Discount factor of bankers
τ 2.0000 Weight of labor in utility function
j 0.0800 Weight of housing in utility function
µ 0.3000 Output share of capital
ν 0.0500 Output share of housing
σ 0.3000 Income share of subprimers
δ 0.0350 Depreciation rate
ms 0.9000 Loan to value ratio for subprimers’ housing
mke 0.9000 Loan to value ratio for entrepreneurs’ capital
mhe 0.9000 Loan to value ratio for entrepreneurs’ housing
γs 0.9000 Parameter to control banker’s capital-asset ratio
γe 0.9000 Parameter to control banker’s capital-asset ratio
χ 1.0000 Parameter to control access to financial market
φ 1.0000 Parameter to control default
ω 0.1000 Bankers’ recovery cost of foreclosed collateral
κ 7.5000 Parameter for labor adjustment cost
e 0.0833 Job search cost
ξ 0.5000 Bargaining power of firms
η 1.1305 Matching technology
θ 0.5000 Parameter for matching function
ϕ 0.0250 Job separation rate
ρa 0.9500 Technology shock persistence
ρj 0.8500 Housing Preference shock persistence
To make collateral constraints always bind, we need different discount factors sat-
isfying βp > βb > βs, βe. We set βp = 0.9925, βb = 0.965, and βs = βe = 0.96. The
output shares of capital, µ, and housing, ν, are set by 0.30 and 0.05 respectively. Then,
the output share of labor income is 1 − µ − ν. Subprimers’ share of labor income, σ,
is set by 0.30. The weights of labor and housing in utility function are 2.00 and 0.08
respectively. Depreciation rate, δ, is assumed to be 0.035. For the parameters to control
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overall leverage, we set ms = m
k
e = m
h
e = γs = γe = 0.90.
To investigate the role of the financial channels of unemployment, we set χ = φ = 1
as baseline scenario and we compare the baseline scenario to the following two different
scenarios: (i) χ = 1 and φ = 0 and (ii) χ = φ = 0. Under baseline scenario, unemployed
subprimers cannot both borrow and repay. Under scenario (i), the unemployed cannot
borrow but can repay since family insurance covers the repayment regardless of job
status. Scenario (ii) considers the case of no financial channels of unemployment. In
scenario (ii), the unemployed can both borrow and repay.
Just before the recent crisis (early 2007), the unemployment rate of US was around
4.5%. We set the parameter for labor adjustment cost, κ, as 7.5 to make the unem-
ployment rates of patient households and subprimers match with the data. Shimer
(2005) [46] estimates the quarterly job seperation rate as around 2.5% in mid 2000s.
We set the job separation rate, ϕ as 0.025 to match the empirical result. We assume
firms and workers have same bargaining power, i.e., ξ = 0.50. For other parameters of
labor market condition, we follows Hertweck (2010) [28]. Job searching cost, e, is 0.0833,
matching technology, η, is 1.1305, and parameter in matching function, θ, is 0.50.
We assume bankers’ recovery cost, ω, is 0.10 to make loan rates for subprimers
and entrepreneurs same in steady state. In steady state, bankers has no loss from
default since they can recover all cost from the default by selling collateral. In other
words, default would not affect bankers’ optimization problem in steady state. However,
subprimers would consider the loss from default since they lose collateral although the
loss could be recovered by lump sum transfer from bankers. Therefore, even in steady
state, default would affect labor market through wage bargaining process.
For exogenous housing preference shock, we follows Iacoviello (2005) [29]. The per-
sistency parameter of housing preference shock, ρj , is set by 0.85. For the persistency
parameter of exogenous technology shock, ρz, we use generally accepted value, 0.95.
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21Iacoviello (2011) [30] has only repayment shock. Iacoviello (2005) [29] use 0.03 for ρz which
is estimated from the model.
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1.5.2 Adverse Housing Preference Shock
To see the role of the interaction between financial market and labor market over the
business cycle, we make 50 percentage point adverse shock in housing preference. The
adverse shock generates around 1.5 percentage point fall in housing price. When the ad-
verse housing preference shock hits the economy, housing demand of patient households
and subprimers decreases. Given fixed supply of aggregate housing, lowered demand
leads to sharp drop in housing price. Under lowered housing price, subprimers cannot
roll over some fraction of outstanding loan because the value of collateral falls. It im-
plies subprimers’ housing demand shifts down more than patient households’ does. As
a result, subprimers decrease housing but patient households increase housing because
of the lowered housing price. The distributional change in housing ownership affects
the consumption of patient households and subprimers. Subprimers increase consump-
tion by selling housing but patient households’ consumption would be suppressed by
acquiring additional housing.
The adverse housing preference shock also affects financial market though the col-
lateral constraint channel. The lowered housing price and subprimers’ selling housing
make loan to subprimers fall sharply which leads to decrease in total demand for loan.
Saving and borrowing rate decreases simultaneously and the lowered saving rate leads
to decrease in patient households’ saving, which supports the patient households’ con-
sumption.
Entrepreneurs should reduce consumption since they should repay some fraction of
outstanding loan because the value of collateral, housing price, falls. To smooth con-
sumption, they reduce capital accumulation but increase cost effective housing. Bankers
also reduce consumption because of credit crunch in financial market which deteriorates
bankers’ profit.
In labor market, unemployment rates of both type of workers increase since lowered
marginal productivity of labor suppresses firms’ surplus from marginal matching and in-
creased workers’ consumption make people ask higher wage bills to work. In equilibrium,
optimal wage bills from wage bargaining decreases.
On balance, adverse housing preference shock leads to fall in housing price, loans,
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investment, employment rate, and output. The results are consistent with the data dur-
ing recent recession. However, the effect of the adverse shock on individual consumption
varies across agents. In aggregate, subprimers’ increased consumption dominates, as a
result aggregate consumption increases22 at the impact of the adverse housing preference
shock.
Now let’s focus on the role of the financial channels of unemployment under the
adverse housing preference shock. With the financial channels of unemployment, credit
constrained workers consider the surplus from borrowing when they are in wage bargain-
ing process. The surplus from borrowing depends on loan rate, loan size, unemployment
rate, and housing price. Since the adverse shock causes fall in loan size, employment
rate, and housing price, the surplus from borrowing decreases under the adverse shock.
It makes subprimers ask higher wage bill to work so subprimers’ job status would be
exacerbated. As a result, subprimers’ unemployment rate jumps up and total loan size
to subprimers falls significantly. Subprimers’ increased wage bill supports their con-
sumption and housing but the increased wage bill suppresses entrepreneurs’ capital and
housing. Higher subprimers’ unemployment also affects financial market. It reduces
total loan demand and increases default. Bankers take loss from the default and it
undermines banking capital which reduces bankers’ loan making ability through capital
adequacy constraint. Loan to entrepreneurs also falls more. As a result, investment and
output decrease more. In conclusion, the negative effect of adverse housing preference
shock is significantly amplified by the financial channels of unemployment.
We think our result could shed light on two labor market puzzles regarding the
”Great Recession” with respect to the supply side of labor: Why has unemployment
rate risen that sharply? and Why has unemployment rate not been recovered even
after the recession seems to end? In conventional job search and matching model,
workers consider only the trade-off between wage bill and leisure. In our model, however,
credit constrained workers consider housing and financial market as well as the trade-off.
During recent recession, housing price fell sharply and it significantly discouraged people
to buy housing. It implies credit constrained workers’ incentive to work significantly
22It contradicts to Iacoviello (2005) [29], where positive housing preference shock increases
consumption.
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falls since lowered housing price decreases both the loss from default and surplus from
borrowing through collateral constraint channel. As of late 2011, housing market is still
stagnated and people are reluctant to buy new housing. It discourages credit constrained
workers to find job.
Figure 1.4: Adverse Housing Preference Shock
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Figure 1.5: Adverse Housing Preference Shock
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Figure 1.6: Adverse Housing Preference Shock
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Figure 1.7: Adverse Housing Preference Shock
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Figure 1.8: Adverse Housing Preference Shock
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Figure 1.9: Adverse Housing Preference Shock
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1.6 Conclusion
In most macro models, people can borrow as much as they want and they never fail
to repay the debt. Furthermore, people has no difficulty in finding job whenever they
want to work. In real world, however, people should be qualified to borrow and some
borrowers cannot repay outstanding loan. In addition, they might not be able to find
job although they want to work.
To overcome the over-simplification of the real economy, some macro models consider
financial frictions and some focuses on labor market friction. However, we think the
two market frictions are closely related to each other in the sense that unemployed
workers can not borrow new loan and not repay outstanding loan. In addition, credit
constrained workers would consider that financial effects of job status when they are in
wage bargaining with their potential employers.
In this paper, we consider the interaction between financial and labor market by
introducing financial friction and labor market friction simultaneously. To link the two
markets, we assume the unemployed cannot borrow new loan and not repay outstanding
loan. We call these two financial channels of unemployment. By the assumption, workers
would consider the financial channels of unemployment when they are in wage bargaining
process.
With this setup, we find that adverse housing preference shock discourages credit
constrained workers from maintaining or seeking job since the adverse shock reduces
not only the benefit from borrowing but also the penalty from defaulting. As a result,
credit constrained workers’ unemployment increases and it lowers the size of outstand-
ing mortgage loan and pushes up the default rate through the financial channels of
unemployment we assume. In a consequence, the adverse housing preference shock
significantly amplifies the business cycles in this model.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, it offers a theoretical framework
to analyze the interaction between financial market and labor market. Second, it gives
alternative answer to the question: why did the collapse in housing market lead so big
fluctuation in financial market and labor market during the recent ”Great Recession”?
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2.1 Introduction
International macroeconomics literature on global imbalances explains why the U.S.
runs a persistent current account deficit. While the U.S. is the net borrower at the
country level, at the banking-sector level, this is not necessary the case. U.S. banks, and
banks in other developed economies, are net lenders to banks in emerging Asian markets
(EAM). At around late 2007, begining of 2008, when losses in the mortgage market
begins to damage U.S. banks’ balance sheets (<Figure 2.1>), U.S. banks deleverage and
reduce deposits and credits (<Figure 2.2>). Not only do they contract loans made to
U.S. borrowers, they contract loans made to foreign borrowing banks as well. <Figure
2.3> documents external (cross-border) assets of banks in developed economies and
<Figure 2.4> documents external liabilities of banks in EAM.
Figure 2.1: Delinquency Rate On Single-Family Residential Mortgages
Source: FRED
Figure 2.2: U.S. Bank Credit and Deposit (Growth Rate)
Source: Board Governors of Federal Reserve System
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Figure 2.3: External Assets of Banks in Developed Economies
Source: Bank for International Settlement
Figure 2.4: External Liabilities of Banks in Selected Emerging Asia
Source: Bank for International Settlement
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With the exception of Japan, who was little exposed to U.S. Mortgage Backed Se-
curities (MBS), all major developed economies show significant contractions in banks’
external assets, which result in significant contractions in EAM banks’ external liabili-
ties1. The documented contraction in international inter-bank lending was followed by
the worldwide drop in GDP growth, both among the developed world (<Figure 2.5>)
and the developing world (<Figure 2.6>). These empirical evidence highlight the im-
portance of the banking system in international transmission of shocks.
Figure 2.5: GDP Growth of Developed Economies
Source: World Bank
Figure 2.6: GDP Growth of Emerging Asia
Source: World Bank
The recent financial crisis in the U.S. was characterized by decline in asset prices,
disruption in the loan market, sharp increase in interest rate spread and a large drop
in GDP. One thing many scholars have agreed is the banking system plays a vital
role in this crisis. There is a number of recent working papers that include bank in
1Kamin and DeMarco (2010) [34] document that the majority of foreign exposure to U.S.
MBS are of European Banking Centers.
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a closed economy DSGE model to model the recent crisis in the U.S.: Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010) [22], Iacoviello (2011) [30], a series of papers by Dib (2010) [12] and
others. Recent development in international macroeconomics literature investigates the
effect of the financial linkage that spread the U.S. mortgage crisis worldwide. Devereux
and Yetman (2010) [11], van Wincoop (2011) [50] build international portfolio models
where leveraged investor in one country holds the financial asset in the other country.
Consequently, any shock that affects the domestic country asset prices will affect the
foreign investor’s balance sheet and spread to the foreign economy. Kollman et al.
(2011) [36], Ueda (2010) [49] and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) [45] build international
business cycles model with banks. In these papers, entrepreneurs in two countries share
a common lender(s). Any shock that hits one economy will affect the common lender(s)
and thus, its (their) borrowers. While both of these features can be true among the
developed world, i.e., U.S. and the Euro Area, they are not the best to describe the
recent crisis for the EAM. Contrary to the large portfolio position of European banks
in U.S. MBS, banks in EAM have no or very little exposure to the U.S. MBS and firms
in these countries have little direct access to foreign bank credits.
We would like to build a two country model with the banking system that plays an
important role in international transmission of shock, which has been largely agreed to be
the main cause of the recent crisis. Our model is built upon the closed economy version in
Iacoviello (2011) [30]. In steady state, banks in the developing country (EAM/domestic
country) borrow from banks in the developed country (the U.S./foreign country). When
some borrowers in the U.S. pay back less than contractually agreed, with the presence of
capital requirement constraint, U.S. banks cut back on lending to U.S. borrowers as well
as EAM banks and raise the inter-bank lending rate. Domestic banks now face more
expensive and less availability of foreign credit, and will reduce loans made to domestic
borrowers. The financial (repayment) shock in the U.S. is transmitted across country
via the banking system.
In another exercise, we investigate the behavior of the model under permanent and
temporary shocks to the weight of domestic bank loan in the foreign bank’s capital
requirement constraint. The permanent shock can be interpreted as a change in bank
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regulation, such as moving from Basel I to Basel II. A temporary shock can be interpreted
as an exogenous drop in domestic banks’ credit ratings. The results for these shocks are
reductions in home output, investment and consumption; and a depreciation of home
real exchange rate.
Our paper is related to a number of empirical papers on global banking. Peek
and Rosengren (1997) [40] study the behavior of Japanese banks in the U.S.. During
the financial crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Japan, Japanese banks in the
U.S. substantially contract the amount of loans made to U.S. borrowers. Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2008) [7] documents that ”foreign lending activity of U.S. bank affiliates
abroad can rely less on the overall strength of the home office in times of tighter monetary
condition in the U.S.”. Popov and Udell (2010) [42] finds that financial distress by West
European and U.S. parent banks has a significant impact on the availability of business
loans for East European firms. Most recently, Imai and Takarabe (2011) [31] use the
data from nationwide and local banks in Japan to test whether banking integration
plays an important role in transmitting financial shocks across geographical boundaries.
They found that nation wide banks do indeed transmit financial shocks originated from
major cities to smaller local economies. The results of our model under different weights
of interbank loan in the capital requirement constraint suggests that across countries,
lower rated economies will suffer more when U.S. banks deleverage. This is consistent
with empirical evidence for the recent crisis, documented by Devereux and Yetman
(2010) [11].
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2.2 The Model1
There are two countries: the domestic country (EAM) and the foreign country (U.S.).
In each country, there are five types of agents: patient households, impatient households,
entrepreneurs, firms and banks. There are two sectors in the economy: tradable good
sector and non-tradable good sector.
Both patient and impatient households (HHs) work for firms in tradable and non-
tradable sectors. They earn wage income and consume tradable goods, non-tradable
goods and housing. Patient HHs supply deposits for banks and earn a return from the
deposits. Impatient HHs, on the other hand, borrow from banks to consume. They can
only borrow up to a fraction of the value of their collateral (house).
Domestic bankers take the deposit from domestic depositors and can also borrow in
the international inter-bank market. They can only borrow up to a fraction of the value
of their capital. They pay a return for the fund they borrow and lend it to domestic
borrowers for a higher return. Foreign bankers take the deposit from foreign depositors.
They lend out to foreign borrowers and domestic bankers. Domestic and foreign bankers
face capital requirement constraint.
Entrepreneurs accumulate physical capital used in both tradable and nontradable
sectors. They finance their investment with income from capital rental and bank loan,
which is subject to a collateral debt constraint.
Firms in tradable and nontradable sectors use capital and labor to produce goods.
They pay wages to HHs.
Consumers’ consumption aggregate is given by: ct =
[
(cNt )
ω−1
ω + (cTt )
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
, where
cT and cN are tradable and non-tradable consumptions. The corresponding price index
is Pt =
[(
PNt
)1−ω
+
(
P Tt
)1−ω] 11−ω
, where P T and PN are tradable and non-tradable
price indices. The consumption aggregate and price indices for the foreign economy
are identical. We denote the price of non-tradabe (tradable) relative to the price of
consumption baskets as pNt (p
T
t ).
1Much of the model’s features are similar to those of Iacoviello (2011) [30] closed economy
model
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2.2.1 Patient Households
A continuum of domestic patient HHs deposit dt, consume composite good cp,t and
housing hp,t, and supply labor to tradable, n
T
p,t, and nontradable, n
N
p,t, sectors. They
earn wage income and return from their deposits. They maximize the infinite sum of
utilities:
max
cp,t,hp,t,n
N
p,t,n
T
p,t,dt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtp
[
ln cp,t + ν lnhp,t + τp ln(1− n
N
p,t − n
T
p,t)
]
subject to budget constraint:
cp,t + dt + qt∆hp,t = Rd,tdt−1 + w
N
p,tn
N
p,t + w
T
p,tn
T
p,t. (2.1)
Rd,t is the return from the deposits and qt is the price of house. w
N
p,t and w
T
p,t are
wages from nontradable and tradable sectors respectively. Their first order conditions
are:
1
cp,t
= βpEt
(
Rd,t+1
cp,t+1
)
(2.2)
qt
cp,t
=
ν
hp,t
+ βpEt
(
qt+1
cp,t+1
)
(2.3)
wNp,t
cp,t
=
τp
1− nNp,t − n
N
p,t
(2.4)
wTp,t
cp,t
=
τp
1− nNp,t − n
T
p,t
(2.5)
Foreign patient HHs optimization problem are identical and indexed with *.
2.2.2 Impatient Households
Domestic impatient HHs also consume goods and housing, and supply labor. ci,t,
hi,t, n
N
i,t, n
T
i,t are impatient HHs’ consumptions, houses, labor supply to nontradable and
tradable sectors. Unlike patient HHs, however, they borrow money from banks, li,t, to
finance consumption. They pay interest Ri,t on the loan and can only borrow up to the
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value of their house. Their maximization problem is:
max
ci,t,hi,t,n
N
i,t,n
T
i,t,li,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ln ci,t + ν lnhi,t + τi ln(1− n
N
i,t − n
T
i,t)
]
subject to budget constraint:
ci,t + qt∆hi,t +Ri,tli,t−1 = li,t + w
N
i,tn
N
i,t + w
T
i,tn
T
i,t, (2.6)
and borrowing constraint:
li,t ≤ miEt
(
qt+1hi,t
Ri,t
)
. (2.7)
Foreign impatient HHs problem is equivalent, except that in their budget constraint,
there is a repayment shock. Their budget constraint is:
c∗i,t + q
∗
t∆h
∗
i,t +R
∗
i,tl
∗
i,t−1 − ǫt
= l∗i,t + w
N∗
i,t n
N∗
i,t + w
T∗
i,t n
T∗
i,t
As in Iacoviello 2010, ǫt is a mean zero, AR(1) shock that captures the exogenous
repayment shock in the U.S.. When ǫt is greater than 0, U.S. impatient HHs pays back
less than their debt obligation.
First order conditions of impatient HHs are:
1
ci,t
= λi,tRi,t + βiEt
(
Ri,t+1
ci,t+1
)
(2.8)
qt
ci,t
=
ν
hi,t
+ λi,tmiEt(qt+1) + βiEt
(
qt+1
ci,t+1
)
(2.9)
wNi,t
ci,t
=
τi
1− nNi,t − n
T
i,t
(2.10)
wTi,t
ci,t
=
τi
1− nNi,t − n
T
i,t
(2.11)
λi,t is the Lagrangian multiplier of impatient HHs borrowing constraint.
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2.2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs’ optimization problem is:
max
ce,t,k
N
t ,k
T
t ,le,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βte ln ce,t
subject to budget constraint:
ce,t + k
N
t + k
T
t +Re,tle,t−1 +
φk
2
(
∆kNt
)2
+
φk
2
(
∆kTt
)2
= le,t + (r
N
k,t + 1− δ)k
N
t−1 + (r
T
k,t + 1− δ)k
T
t−1 (2.12)
and borrowing constraint:
le,t ≤ me(k
N
t + k
T
t ). (2.13)
ce,t is entrepreneurs’ consumption. k
N
t , k
T
t are entrepreneurs’ capital in the tradable
and nontradable sectors. They finance investment with income from capital rental in
the two sectors rNk,t + 1, r
T
k,t + 1 and bank loan le,t. The bank loan cannot exceed the
value of their capital. Entrepreneurs pay banks a return Re,t on the loan. Similar to
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), we assume that investment uses the same goods
composite as the consumption basket. φk2
(
∆kNt
)2
and φk2
(
∆kTt
)2
are convex capital
adjustment cost that entrepreneurs face when they change their stock of capital in the
tradable and non-tradable sectors. Entrepreneurs’ first order conditions are:
1
ce,t
(1 + φk∆k
N
t ) =
λ′e,t
ce,t
me + βeEt
{
1
ce,t+1
[(rNk,t+1 + 1− δ) + φk∆k
N
t+1]
}
(2.14)
1
ce,t
(1 + φk∆k
T
t ) =
λ′e,t
ce,t
me + βeEt
{
1
ce,t+1
[(rTk,t+1 + 1− δ) + φk∆k
T
t+1]
}
(2.15)
1
ce,t
=
λ′e,t
ce,t
+ βeEt
(
Re,t+1
ce,t+1
)
(2.16)
λ′e,t
ce,t
is the Lagrangian multiplier of entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint. Foreign
entrepreneurs problems and first order conditions are similar.
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2.2.4 Bankers
Domestic Bankers: Domestic bankers borrow from domestic depositors and for-
eign banks, supply loans to impatient HHs and entrepreneurs. The fund they obtain
from the foreign bank is in term of tradable good. They pay returns on the fund they
borrow, Rd,t and Rf,t, to depositors and foreign banks respectively. They charge higher
interests to the loans they lend out: Ri,t and Re,t to impatient HHs and entrepreneurs.
They face a capital requirement constraint and a collateral debt constraint. The two
constraint together pin down the level of foreign asset in the model. Their optimization
problem is:
max
cb,t,dt,li,t,le,t,lf,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb ln cb,t
subject to budget constraint:
cb,t +Rd,tdt−1 + le,t + li,t +Rf,tp
T
t lf,t−1
= dt +Re,tle,t−1 +Ri,tli,t−1 + p
T
t lf,t−{
φe
2
(∆le,t)
2 +
φi
2
(∆li,t)
2 +
φd
2
(∆dt)
2 +
φf
2
∆(pTt lf,t)
2
}
(2.17)
capital requirement constraint: dt + p
T
t lf,t ≤ γele,t + γili,t (2.18)
and foreign debt constraint: pTt lf,t ≤ mf
(
li,t + le,t − dt
Rf,t
)
(2.19)
The international inter-bank loan lf,t is denominated in tradable good price. In
domestic consumption good unit, its value is pTt lf,t. Domestic bankers use their capital
as collateral, which is equal to total asset li,t+ le,t minus liability dt. Similar assumption
on interbank lending constraint has been made by Ali Dib (2010). mf is the loan to value
in the international financial market. φe2 (∆le,t)
2, φi2 (∆li,t)
2, φd2 (∆dt)
2,
φf
2 (∆p
T
t lf,t)
2 are
adjustment costs that banks face when they change their loans and deposit.
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Their first order conditions are:
1
cb,t
[1− φd∆dt] =
λ′b,t
cb,t
+
λ′f,t
cb,t
mf + βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[Rd,t+1 − φd∆dt+1]
}
(2.20)
1
cb,t
[1 + φi∆li,t] =
λ′b,t
cb,t
γi +
λ′f,t
cb,t
mf + βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[Ri,t+1 + φi∆li,t+1]
}
(2.21)
1
cb,t
[1 + φe∆le,t] =
λ′b,t
cb,t
γe +
λ′f,t
cb,t
mf + βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[Re,t+1 + φe∆le,t+1]
}
(2.22)
1
cb,t
[
1− φf∆
(
pTt lf,t
)]
=
λ′b,t
cb,t
+
λ′f,t
cb,t
Rf,t
+ βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[
Rf,t+1
pTt+1
pTt
− φf∆
(
pTt+1lf,t+1
)]}
. (2.23)
λ′b,t and λ
′
f,t are multipliers on the capital requirement and foreign debt constraints,
multiplied by banker consumptions. The intuition here is similar to that of Iacoviellow
2010, with one exception, the presence of λ′f,t. To increase one unit of consumption
today, bankers can either increase one unit of today’s deposit or today’s inter-bank
loan (today’s liabilities), or reduce one unit of today’s consumers’ loan or business loan
(today’s assets). If he, for example, choose to increase dt, re-arranging the equations
gives:
1− λ′b,t − λ
′
f,tmf − φd∆dt = Et
{
βb
cb,t
cb,t+1
[Rd,t+1 − φd∆dt+1]
}
.
The right hand side of the equation is the cost of increasing one unit of deposit this
period, which is equal to the additional return tomorrow that bankers has to pay on the
deposit, less the lower cost that bankers pay on adjustment cost tomorrow, discounted
into today value by bankers’s stochastic discount factor
{
βb
cb,t
cb,t+1
}
. The left hand side
is the marginal benefit of consuming one more unit today, minus the cost of tightening
capital requirement constraint, λ′b,t, minus the cost of tightening foreign debt constraint,
λ′f,tmf , minus the adjustment cost in changing deposit that bankers face today. Similar
argument holds if bankers choose, instead, to increase foreign loan or decrease loans
made to domestic borrowers.
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Foreign Bankers: Foreign bankers borrow the fund from foreign depositors and
supply loan to foreign impatient HHs, entrepreneurs. Foreign banks also lend to do-
mestic banks in the form of tradable goods. They only face budget constraint and
capital requirement constraint. They are subject to the endowment shock ǫt. Their
maximization problem is:
max
c∗
b,t
,d∗t ,l
∗
i,t,l
∗
e,t,lf,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β∗b )
t ln c∗b,t
subject to budget constraint:
c∗b,t +R
∗
d,td
∗
t−1 + l
∗
e,t + l
∗
i,t + p
T∗
t lf,t
= d∗t +R
∗
e,tl
∗
e,t−1 +R
∗
i,tl
∗
i,t−1 +Rf,tp
T∗
t lf,t−1 − ǫ
∗
t
−
{
φe
2
(∆l∗e,t)
2 +
φi
2
(∆l∗i,t)
2 +
φd
2
(∆d∗t )
2 +
φf
2
∆(pT∗t lf,t)
2
}
(2.24)
and capital requirement constraint:
d∗t ≤ γel
∗
e,t + γil
∗
i,t + γfp
T∗
t lf,t. (2.25)
Their first order conditions are similar to those of domestic banks without the mul-
tiplier on the foreign debt constraint λ′f,t. When foreign banks increase their consump-
tion by increasing deposit or reducing loans, only their capital requirement constraint
is tightened.
2.2.5 Firms
Firms in tradable and nontradable sectors use labor from HHs, capital from en-
trepreneurs to produce tradable and nontradable goods. They pay wages to HHs and
capital rental fees to entrepreneurs.
Non-tradable Sector:
max
kNt−1,n
N
p,t,n
N
i,t
πNt = p
N
t y
N
t − r
N
k,tk
N
t−1 − w
N
p,tn
N
p,t − w
N
i,tn
N
i,t
subject to yNt = z
N
t (k
N
t−1)
α
[
(nNp,t)
1−σ(nNi,t)
σ
]1−α
.
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Tradable Sector:
max πTt = p
T
t y
T
t − r
T
k,tk
T
t−1 − w
T
p,tn
T
p,t − w
T
i,tn
T
i,t
subject to yTt = z
T
t (k
T
t−1)
α
[
(nTp,t)
1−σ(nTi,t)
σ
]1−α
.
The Cobb-Douglas aggregate of labor is to control for the economic size of patient
and impatient HHs in the economy, as in Iacoviello (2005 [29], 2011 [30]). The higher σ
is, the larger the size of impatient HHs vs. patient HHs. The Cobb-Douglas aggregate is
used, instead of a simple linear combination, to pin down the steady state labor supply
to each sector. In the model with two sectors and two agents, even though total labor
demand in each sector and total labor supply of each type of agents are determined, a
linear aggregate cannot determine what fraction of labor effort of each agent is allocated
to each sector.
2.2.6 Market Clearing Conditions
The housing market clearing conditions are:
hp,t + hi,t = 1,
h∗p,t + h
∗
i,t = 1.
The good market clearing conditions for tradable good are:
yTt + lf,t
=
(
pTt
)−ω [
cp,t + ci,t + ce,t + cb,t + k
N
t + k
T
t − (1− δ)
(
kNt−1 + k
T
t−1
)
+ adjt
]
+Rf,tlf,t−1
yT∗t +Rf,tlf,t−1
=
(
pT∗t
)−ω [
c∗p,t + c
∗
i,t + c
∗
e,t + c
∗
b,t + k
N∗
t + k
T∗
t − (1− δ)
(
kN∗t−1 + k
T∗
t−1
)
+ adj∗t
]
+ lf,t
Here, adjt (adj
∗
t ) is the sum of all adjustment costs the domestic (foreign) bankers
and entrepreneurs face. The market clearing conditions for non-tradable are implied
from the budget constraints of all agents and the above four market clearing conditions.
44
2.3 Key Assumptions and Calibration
2.3.1 Key Assumptions
The steady state deposit and lending rates are as followed:
Table 2.1: Deposit and Lending Rates in Steady State
Domestic Country Foreign Country
Deposit Rates Rd =
1
βp
R∗d =
1
β∗p
Interbank Rate Rf = (1− γf )
1
β∗
b
+ γfRd
Loan to IHs Ri = Rd +
1
δ1
(Rd −Rf ) R
∗
i = (1− γi)
1
β∗
b
+ γiRd
Loan to Entrepreneur Re = Rd +
1
δ2
(Rd −Rf ) R
∗
e = (1− γe)
1
β∗
b
+ γeRd
where δ1 =
λ′
f
(Rf−mf )
(1−βbRd−λ
′
f
mf )(1−γi)
and δ2 =
λ′
f
(Rf−mf )
(1−βbRd−λ
′
f
mf )(1−γe)
. Detailed solutions
can be found in the Appendix.
In steady state, foreign banks takes the deposit from foreign savers (patient HHs)
and lend out to foreign impatient HHs, foreign entrepreneurs and domestic banks. In
order for foreign banks to accept the deposit, the return on deposits that foreign banks
must pay should be ”low enough” for foreign banks. Specifically, 1
β∗
b
> R∗d =
1
β∗p
,
or foreign bankers are more impatient than foreign depositors. In order for foreign
impatient HHs and entrepreneurs to borrow from foreign banks, the interest rates the
foreign banks charge must be ”low enough” for them, or 1
β∗e
> R∗e = (1 − γe)
1
β∗
b
+ γe
1
β∗p
and 1
β∗i
> R∗i = (1 − γi)
1
β∗
b
+ γi
1
β∗p
. Foreign entrepreneurs and impatient HHs are more
impatient than the weighted average of foreign bankers and foreign depositors. The
intuition here is similar to that of Iacoviello 2010.
In the interbank market, domestic banks borrow from foreign banks because the fund
supplied from foreign banks is cheaper than the fund supplied from domestic depositors.
From the Appendix solution for the multiplier on the interbank borrowing constraint,
one can easily verify that the condition Rf < Rd ensures the binding of the constraint
in steady state. It is equivalent to: (1 − γf )
1
β∗
b
+ γf
1
β∗p
< 1
βp
, or savers in domestic
country are more impatient than the weighted average of savers and bankers in the
foreign country. For domestic borrowers to accept these rates the domestic bank charge,
they have to be ”impatient enough”, or 1
βe
> Re and
1
βi
> Ri.
Within the large literature on the global imbalance, to generate the observed cur-
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rent account in the U.S. and other developing nations, especially China, the common
assumption is the representative agent in the U.S. is more impatient than a representa-
tive in the developing country. To generate the flow of fund at the banking sector level
from the U.S. to EAM, we only assume that the savers in EAM are more impatient
than the weighted average of savers and bankers in the U.S. Other agents in the EAM
can be more patient than the U.S. Thus, our assumption does not contradict with the
assumption in the global imbalance literature.
2.3.2 Calibration
Table 2.2: Agents Discount Factor
Domestic Agent Discount Factor Value Foreign Agent Discount Factor Value
βp 0.9875 β
∗
p 0.9925
βi 0.95 β
∗
i 0.94
βe 0.95 β
∗
e 0.94
βb 0.96 β
∗
b 0.975
The discount factors for each agent are given by table <Table 2.2>. All these values
are within the range of two standard deviation bands interval (0.91, 0.99) estimated by
Carroll and Samwick (1997) [6]. They are chosen according to the key assumptions.
The fraction of impatient HHs σ is 0.5. Campbell and Mankiw (1990) [5] estimated
the fraction of liquidity constrained HHs to be 0.5. Iacoviello (2005 [29], 2010 [30])
set the fraction of impatient HHs to be 0.36 and 0.3 respectively. Setting σ to be 0.5
is at the upperbound of the values used in the literature. It gives the convenience
in algebraically solving the model in closed form without changing its fundamentals.
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable good ω is 0.44 as estimated
by Stockman and Tesar (1995) [48]. γi, γe are 0.9 as in Iacoviello (2011) [30]. We choose
γf to be 0.9. Parameters controlling bankers’ adjustment cost φd, φi, φe, φf are 0.25.
Loan to values mi,me,mf are 0.9, 0.9 and 0.7 respectively. Capital depreciation rate δ
is 0.025. The rest of the model’s parameters are chosen from the closed economy model
by Iacoviello (2011) [30].
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Table 2.3: Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
α 0.35 ν 0.08
τp 2 τi 2
φk 2
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Repayment shock
The repayment shock is exogenous. Alternatively, one can endogenize the default
shock as function of the underlying state of the economy. For example, in Forlati and
Lambertini (2011) [20], borrowers default endogenously, when they find that the value
of their collateral is lower than the value of the loan they borrow. Within the context
of this paper, we treat the repayment shock as exogenous for simplicity and tractability.
A further step, to describe how default can happen endogenously and depend on the
fundamental of the lending country, and through banking sector, spread to the borrowing
country, is worthwhile for future investigation.
Figure 2.7: Impulse Response: Foreign repayment shock
<Figure 2.7> plots the impulse response results of foreign macroeconomic variables
for the foreign repayment shocks. Default coming from foreign impatient HHs forces the
foreign banks to contract both loans and deposit to maintain their required capital-asset
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ratio. The results are a fall in output, asset price, investment, employment, loan and
an increase in lending interest rates. Similar results have been obtained in Iacoviello
(2011) [30] closed economy version.
Figure 2.8: Impulse Response: Foreign repayment shock
<Figure 2.8> plots the impulse response of international interbank loan and interest
rate. When the lending banks from the developed country contract the loan for all of
their borrowers, they do so for the borrowing banks as well.
Figure 2.9: Impulse Response: Foreign repayment shock
<Figure 2.9> plots the impulse response results of domestic macroeconomic vari-
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ables. When foreign banks contract asset by raising lending rates to maintain their cap-
ital requirement ratio, domestic banks now face more expensive (as Rf increases) and
less availability credits (international borrowing constraint tighten when Rf increases),
they have to raise domestic lending rates and reduce the loans made to domestic bor-
rowers. A domestic credit crunch, characterized by a decrease in loan and an increase
in borrowing interest rates has occurred following the default from abroad.
Domestic output, investment and asset prices fall, which are the typical results fol-
lowing a credit crunch. What is interesting here is the movement of resources across
sector and the dynamics of the real exchange rate. The international loan is denom-
inated in tradable good. When the loan that foreign banks made to domestic banks
suddenly decreases, in foreign country, the demand for tradable good decreases and the
price of tradable relative to non-tradable decreases. In domestic country, the supply
of tradable good suddenly decreases, which increases the price of tradable relative to
non-tradable.
Figure 2.10: Impulse Response: Foreign repayment shock
As a result, the real exchange rate decreases on impact. Over time, in domestic
country, labor and investment move from non-tradable to tradable sector to equalize the
prices in two sectors, exchange rate appreciate toward its steady state value. <Figure
2.10> plots the impulse responses of real exchange rate and price of tradable and non-
tradable in foreign and domestic country.
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Figure 2.11: Real Effective Exchange Rate of Selected Emerging Asia
Source: Bank for International Settlement
<Figure 2.11> documents the real exchange rate movement of Chinese Taipei, India
and Korea. The sharp reduction in the real exchange rate of these country against the
U.S. happened around the time when U.S. banks substantially deleveraged their balance
sheet with respect to Asia.
Figure 2.12: Impulse Response: Foreign repayment shock
<Figure 2.12> plots the impulse responses of repayment shock under different values
of γf . A lower value of γf can be interpreted as banks’ strategy to contract foreign loan
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and gives priority to long-term domestic borrowers. Peek and Rosengren (1997) [40]
documented this behavior among Japanese banks. It can also be interpreted as a lower
credit rating of the domestic economy. With a smaller γf , the repayment shock generates
much larger volatilities of domestic variables while decreasing the volatilities of foreign
variables. In other word, a lower γf , helps mitigate the effects of the financial shock in
the developed country where it originates, while amplifying the effects on the developing
country. The intuition for this comes from foreign banks’ capital requirement constraint:
d∗t ≤ γel
∗
e,t + γil
∗
i,t + γfp
T∗
t lf,t.
Deposit equals asset minus equity:
l∗i,t + l
∗
e,t + p
T∗
t lf,t − E
∗ ≤ γel
∗
e,t + γil
∗
i,t + γfp
T∗
t lf,t
(1− γe)l
∗
e,t + (1− γi)l
∗
i,t + (1− γf )p
T∗
t lf,t ≤ E
∗. (2.26)
When default happens and decreases foreign banks’ equity, these banks will have to
decrease the left hand side of the above equation. When γf is smaller than γi, γe, it is
more beneficial for the foreign banks to contract international loan. One unit decrease
in lf,t will loosen the capital requirement constraint by 1 − γf , which is larger than
1− γe (1− γi) if banks contract business (consumer) loan. The adjustment costs banks
face are convex and together with the γ will determine how banks contract its portfolio.
Without the convexity in costs, banks will find it most beneficial to contract foreign
loan only when γf is lower relative to γi and γe.
Devereux and Yetman (2010) [11], using the data for the recent crisis, found that the
magnitude of capital flow from one country to the U.S. depends on the country’s foreign
currency credit rating. A lower rating results in a larger capital outflow of the country
to the U.S., following the recent U.S. crisis. A lower rating asset will have a higher
weight in banks’ risk weighted asset (RWA) portfolio in equation (1.26), or a lower γf
in our model. Thus, the empirical evidence is in line with our model prediction, that
countries perceived as more risky will suffer more from the U.S. crisis than less risky
countries.
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2.4.2 γf shock
Permanent Shock
A permanent shock to γf can be interpreted as a change in regulation. A real world
example of this is the change from the Basel I Accord to the Basel II Accord. Under
the Basel I Accord, banks’ assets were classified into categories such as sovereign, banks,
collateral, etc. All debts under the same category will carry the same weight in banks’
RWA and banks were required to hold capital equal to 8% of banks’ total RWA. For
example, all corporate debts will have the weight of 100% and all government debts
will have the weight of 0%. The Basel II Accord no longer gives the same weight to all
assets in one category if they have different level of risks. Borrowing banks in developing
country, if considered risky by Basel II’s new assessment of risk, will have a higher weight
in the lending bank’s RWA.
Figure 2.13: Impulse Response: Permanent Shock to γf
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Figure 2.14: Impulse Response: Permanent Shock to γf
Figure 2.15: Impulse Response: Permanent Shock to γf
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Figure 2.16: Impulse Response: Permanent Shock to γf
<Figure 2.13> to <Figure 2.16> have impulse response for a 10% permanent neg-
ative shock to γf . As the international inter-bank loan have a higher weight in the
lending banks’ RWA, lending banks permanently increase the lending rate, Rf , and de-
crease the amount of loan made to borrowing banks in the developing country, lf . The
steady state interbank lending rate is: Rf =
1
β∗
B
−
[
1
β∗
B
− 1
β∗
H
]
γf . When γf decreases, Rf
converges to a higher steady state. The steady state lending rates to domestic borrowers
are weighted average of interbank lending rate and domestic deposit rate. Thus, they
converge to a new higher steady state. As a result, domestic consumption, output and
investment converge to a lower steady state.
As γf permanently decreases, from equation 25, we see that foreign banks’ capital
requirement constraint tightens, foreign banks can ”loosen” the constraint by either
deleveraging, reducing the total size of its RWA and deposit, or restructuring its portfo-
lio, hold less asset with high weight and more asset with low weight. The foreign banks’
adjustment cost helps pin the optimal path for their deposit demand and loan supply.
Contrary to the repayment shock, when the only option is to deleverage, foreign banks
in this case also restructure their portfolio and holds more assets with lower weight in
its RWA. As a result, foreign deposit goes down (deleverage effect) and loans to foreign
IHs and entrepreneurs go up (portfolio restructuring effect). The foreign investment,
consumption and output go up. New steady state foreign domestic lending rates, which
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only depends on foreign bank and patient HHs time preference, stay the same.
Temporary Shock
<Figure 2.17> to <Figure 2.20> have the impulse responses for the temporary neg-
ative shock to γf . The temporary shock can be interpreted as an exogenous temporary
drop in domestic banks’ credit rating. A real world example for this is the drop in
domestic bank credit rating of South Korean banks during the Asian financial crisis in
1997.
Figure 2.17: Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
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Figure 2.18: Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
Figure 2.19: Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
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Figure 2.20: Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
<Figure 2.21> has the graph of credit ratings of nationwide South Korean banks
and the South Korean Won - US Dollar exchange rate. Credit Ratings of major banks in
South Korea drop significantly before and right at the beginning of the crisis. The results
of the impulse response shows a drop in domestic gdp, consumption and investment.
The foreign loan given to domestic banks contracts and interest rate increases. The real
exchange rate also depreciates as a result of tightening foreign credit. These were also
the experience of South Korea during the financial crisis.
Figure 2.21: Korean won/USD Exchange Rate and Korean Banks’ Credit Rating
Source: Moody’s
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2.5 Relation to empirical facts and existing literature
For the foreign repayment shock, our model generates a drop in output, consumption,
investment, loans and housing prices and an increase in bank lending rates in both home
and foreign countries. The borrowing country’s real exchange rate also depreciates.
Qualitatively, our model matches the empirical facts. The lowest drop in the foreign
and domestic consumption are 2 ∗ 10−3 and 2 ∗ 10−4, respectively. The drops of foreign
and domestic investment are 5 ∗ 10−3 and 5 ∗ 10−4. The transmission of shock to the
foreign country is just 10%. Quantitatively, our model does not match the magnitude
of international transmission observed in data.
Devereux and Yetman (2010) [11] build an international portfolio model to describe
the recent crisis. Leveraged investors in each country holds foreign equity in their
portfolio. The total value of their portfolio have to be greater than a constant times
their equities. When a shock hits the home country and decreases home asset prices, the
value of portfolio of home and foreign investors decreases, forcing them to deleverage.
Eric van Wincoop (2011) [50] build a model with leveraged financial institutions, who
invest in both home and foreign asset. The default shock in his model is similar to the
repayment shock in ours. Since foreign financial institutions hold domestic asset, the
domestic default shock damages the foreign bank balance sheet and spread the crisis
to the foreign country. The main difference between our model and theirs, is in our
model, leveraged domestic bank does not hold foreign asset. In our model, shock is
transmitted through a credit crunch in the interbank loan market. Their models fit well
for the comovement between U.S. and Europe since European Banking Centers were
the majority foreign holders of U.S. MBS. Our model fits the story between U.S. and
the EAM. EAM were not directly exposed to the U.S. MBS as only 3% of U.S. ABS are
held outside of U.S., Europe and Carribean.
Kollmann et al. (2011) [36], Ueda (2010) [49] and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011) [45]
also build international business cycle model with leveraged bank(s). In their models,
borrowers in both countries share a common lender(s). When shock hits one country
and damage the balance sheet of the common lender(s), the common lender(s) contract
loans in both countries. In their model, borrowers in one country have direct access to
58
the credit of the foreign lenders. The story works in the developed world. For the EAM,
this is not the case as few borrowers in EAM have direct access to U.S. bank credit.
In our model, borrowers in EAM only borrow fund from the U.S. through domestic
banks. Thus, in steady state, banks in EAM are net borrowers in our model, which is
an empirical fact and cannot be generated with a model of two symmetric countries.
Another main difference between our model and previous models with leveraged fi-
nancial investors (banks) is in our capital requirement (leverage) constraint, we separate
the weights of different assets in the lending bank RWA. Thus, we are able to investigate
the behavior of international transmission of shock when borrowing banks have different
credit rating. We found that when the borrowing economy has lower rating, the mag-
nitude of capital flows back to the U.S. in the crisis is higher. Our result is consistent
with the empirical finding in Devereux and Yetman (2010) [11].
2.6 Conclusion
Recent financial crisis in the U.S. highlights the role that banking sector plays in
the global macroeconomy. There has been substantial empirical evidence that suggests
financial crisis can be transmitted across border through the contraction in cross-border
loan in banking system. The very first empirical paper was by Peek and Rosengren
(1997) [40] and later (2000 [41] who study Japanese financial crisis and the effects on
the U.S.. More recent empirical paper study the U.S. financial crisis and the effects on
lending in other countries. Such paper are Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008 [7], 2009 [8]),
Popov and Udell (2010) [42]. Our model provide a theoretical framework to support
the hypothesis. When financial shock hits one country, the cross border inter-bank loan
contracts and transmits the shock to another country.
Our paper is also related to a number of papers that study the effects of shocks to
international lending rate on a small open economy. These include Faia and Iliopulos
(2010) [17], Christensen et al. (2009) [9], Buyukkarabacak (2008) [4]. These papers
treat the source of shock as exogenous. Our paper go one step further and point out
the lending country’s financial shock may be what is behind the increase in the interna-
tional lending rate. Our paper also differ from other recent papers with leveraged banks
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(investors) in three dimensions. First, the shock from the source country is not directly
transmitted by damaging the foreign banks balance sheet, but rather, from contracting
the loan in the interbank market. This helps apply our model for the EAM, who was
not directly exposed to the U.S. MBS. Second, the borrowers in one country does not
borrow directly from foreign bank, but through domestic bank. Thus, in steady state,
at banking level, EAM are net borrowers from the U.S.. Third, we separate the weight
of international loans from weights for consumer and business loans in the capital re-
quirement constraint. This helps us investigate the dynamics of the borrowing country
when its banks have different credit rating levels and when there is a bank regulation
change in the lending country.
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Chapter 3
Uncertainty, Collateral
Constrained Borrower, and the
Business Cycle1
by Taesu Kang2
1We thank Fabio Ghironi, Peter Ireland, and seminar participants at BC Dissertation Seminar
and R@BC for helpful comments.
2Boston College, Email: kangta@bc.edu
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3.1 Introduction
Uncertainty has been known (at least suspected) as having negative effects on the
economy. Empirically, Bloom (2009) [3] finds that uncertainty shock produces a rapid
drop and rebound in output and employment because higher uncertainty temporarily
keeps firms from investing and hiring. However, in the sense of macro modeling, to
make co-movement among economic variables is not trivial under uncertainty shock
because there exists precautionary saving motive in generally accepted utility functions.
In standard RBC model, the precautionary saving motive decreases consumption but
increases investment and labor under uncertainty shock, which results in increase in
output.
Figure 3.1: Uncertainty Shock in standard RBC model
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<Figure 3.1> shows the impulse responses of key macro variables to technology
volatility shock in standard RBC model. The technology volatility shock makes house-
holds reduce consumption (increase save) and work more for precautionary reason. Since
saving is equal to investment in standard RBC model, more saving implies more invest-
ment so more output, given more labor. Higher risk aversion, higher precautionary
motive. So households with higher risk aversion reduce more consumption and increase
more labor. As a result, volatility shock increase more output under higher risk aversion.
It contradicts to empirical results and generally accepted intuition. To fill this gap, re-
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searchers are trying to deviate from standard RBC model to generate the co-movement
under uncertainty shock3.
Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2010) [38] introduces idiosyncratic technology
shock to heterogeneous firms and non-convex adjustment cost for capital and labor
change. They find that uncertainty shock makes firms become more cautious about
investment and hiring and that adjustment cost makes slow the reallocation of capital
and labors across firms. As a result, uncertainty shock leads to large falls in productivity
growth. Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2010) [47] also considers idiosyncartic shock to
heterogenous firms and imperfect capital markets when issuing risky bonds and equity
to finance investment projects. They shows that increase in dispersion of firm level
returns pushes up the credit spread of firms which leads to drop in investment. Gourio
(2010) [27] introduces time varying risk of disaster into a standard RBC model and shows
that increase in disaster risk can generate simulataneous drop in investment, labor, and
output by reducing return on capital.
Finally, Basu and Bundick (2011) [2] argues that BFJ (2010), GSZ (2010), and Gou-
rio (2010) are limited in getting desired co-movement among variables. For example,
Gourio (2010) has increase in consumption at the impact of risk shock and the con-
sumption decreases slowly. In addition, his main results depend on the assumption
about intertemporal elasticity of substitution larger than 1 which is controversial. BB
(2011) finds that a New Keynesian model with Rotemberg type price stickiness and
modest capital adjustment cost can produce the desired co-movement among key macro
variables without any other complicated modeling devices. In their framework, precau-
tionary motive increases supply of labor but counter-cyclical markup via price stickiness
reduces demand of labor. The decrease in labor demand also lowers investment by
firms. Thus, the desire by households to work more in precautionary reason leads to
lower labor, investment, and as a result output under uncertainty shock.
In this paper, we try to produce the co-movement among key macro variables under
uncertainty shock by introducing collateral constrained borrowers into otherwise stan-
dard RBC model. Our model is different from BFJ (2010) and GSJ (2010) in that we
3Basu and Bundick (2011) summarizes the co-movement issue and related literatures very
well. So we explain the issue and related literatures briefly.
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do not depend on idiosyncratic technology shock and from BB (2011) in that we have
no price stickiness and capital adjustment cost. Gourio (2010) is also different from ours
since we have time varying volatility shock in technology instead of disaster shock.
Our model is basically based on Iacoviello (2005 [29], 2011 [30]) in which patient
households save but subprimers and entrepreneurs borrow against their collateral. By
introducing time-varying volatility in technology shock into the model, we find that
highly indebted borrowers sell collaterals to avoid uncertainty in future consumption.
The deleveraging lowers housing price and it causes credit crunch through the well
known collateral constraint channel. As a result, housing price, loan, consumption, in-
vestment, labor, and output decrease at the impact of uncertainty shock in the economy
under modest risk aversion. We find that the negative effect of the uncertainty shock is
strengthened in the economy with higher indebted borrowers especially through larger
drop in consumption. However, the desired co-movement disappears at least in capital
in the economy with high precautionary motive since the high precautionary motive
dominates the collateral constraint channel. Even in the economy with high precaution-
ary motive, the collateral constraint channel keeps investment from jumping and still
causes larger drop in other macro variables such as consumption, housing price, and
loan.
For solution method, we use third-order perturbation method which Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2009) suggests. As they points, uncertainty shock has no independent
role up to second-order approximation in our model. However, third-order approxima-
tion is sufficient to identify the distinct role of uncertainty shock.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the DSGE
model with collateral constrained borrowers and time varying volatility shock. In ad-
dition, we explain the solution method we use to solve the model. Section 3 reports
calibration of parameters and impulse responses of volatility shock and section 4 con-
clusions. An appendix provides some additional details.
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3.2 The Model
We have 4 agents in the model: patient households, subprimers, entrepreneurs, and
firms. We will use subscript p, s, and e for patient households, subprimers, and en-
trepreneurs respectively.
3.2.1 Patient Households
Patient households have CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility function4
over consumption goods, cp,t, housing, hp,t, and leisure, 1− lp,t. They supply labor, lp,t,
to firms for real wage, wp,t. They save, bp,t, at interest rate, Rt, to lend it to subprimers
and entrepreneurs.
Patient households solve following utility maximization problem:
max
cp,t,lp,t,hp,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtp


[
c1−τ−γp,t (1− lp,t)
τhγp,t
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ


subject to cp,t + qt (hp,t − hp,t−1) + bp,t = Rt−1bp,t−1 + wp,tlp,t (3.1)
where βp is discount factor of patient households, qt is housing price, τ and γ are
parameters to control relative preferences for leisure and housing.
First order conditions are given by:
up,c,t = βpEt (Rtup,c,t+1) (3.2)
wp,tup,c,t = up,l,t (3.3)
qtup,c,t = up,h,t + βpEt (qt+1up,c,t+1) (3.4)
where up,c,t, up,l,t, and up,h,t denote marginal utility of consumption, leisure, and housing
respectively.
Patient households’ marginal utilities of consumption, leisure, and housing are given
4Iacoviello (2005, 2010) use separable logarithmic utility function for simplicity. To see the
role of risk aversion, we use CRRA utility function here. As it is well known, logarithmic utility
function is a special case (when σ = 1) of CRRA utility function. Since we couldn’t find any ex-
ample of CRRA utility function having consumption, leisure, and housing in it simulataneously,
we choose the simplest form.
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by:
up,c,t = (1− τ − γ)
[
c1−τ−γp,t (1− lp,t)
τhγp,t
]
−σ
c−τ−γp,t (1− lp,t)
τhγp,t,
up,l,t = τ
[
c1−τ−γp,t (1− lp,t)
τhγp,t
]
−σ
c1−τ−γp,t (1− lp,t)
τ−1hγp,t,
up,h,t = γ
[
c1−τ−γp,t (1− lp,t)
τhγp,t
]
−σ
c1−τ−γp,t (1− lp,t)
τhγ−1p,t .
3.2.2 Subprimers
Subprimers also have CRRA utility function over consumption goods, cs,t, housing,
hs,t, and leisure, 1− ls,t. They supply labor, ls,t, to firms for real wage, ws,t. In contrast
to patient households, however, they borrow, bs,t, at interest rate, Rt from patient
households. We assume subprimers are collateral constrained so the amount of loan is
determined by some fraction of expected future value of their own housing.
Subprimers solve following utility maximization problem:
max
cs,t,ls,t,hs,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βts


[
c1−τ−γs,t (1− lst)
τhγs,t
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ


subject to cs,t + qt (hs,t − hs,t−1) +Rt−1bs,t−1 = bs,t + ws,tls,t, (3.5)
Rtbs,t ≤ msEt (qt+1hs,t) , (3.6)
where βs is discount factor of subprimers, ms is LTV (Loan to Value) ratio against
housing.
Equation (3.6) captures the idea of collateral constraint. Total repayment of debt,
Rtbs,t, at next period should be less (0 < ms < 1) than the expected next period value
of housing, Et (qt+1hs,t).
Subprimers’ first order conditions are given by:
us,c,t = λs,tRt + βsEt (Rtus,c,t+1) , (3.7)
qtus,c,t = us,h,t + λs,tmsEt (qt+1) + βsEt (qt+1us,c,t+1) , (3.8)
ws,tus,c,t = us,l,t, (3.9)
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where λs,t is a Lagrangian multiplier for collateral constraint, us,c,t, us,l,t, and us,h,t are
marginal utility of consumption, leisure, and housing respectively.
Subprimers’ marginal utility of consumption, leisure, and housing are given by:
us,c,t = (1− τ − γ)
[
c1−τ−γs,t (1− ls,t)
τhγs,t
]
−σ
c−τ−γs,t (1− ls,t)
τhγs,t,
us,l,t = τ
[
c1−τ−γs,t (1− ls,t)
τhγs,t
]
−σ
c1−τ−γs,t (1− ls,t)
τ−1hγs,t,
us,h,t = γ
[
c1−τ−γs,t (1− ls,t)
τhγs,t
]
−σ
c1−τ−γs,t (1− ls,t)
τhγ−1s,t .
3.2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have preferences over only consumption goods, ce,t. They do not work
but accumulate capital, kt, and housing, he,t, for rental profit r
k
t and qtr
h
t respectively.
Entrepreneurs also borrow, be,t, from patient households at interest rate, Rt, and they
are collateral constrained against their own housing and capital.
As Iacoviello(2005, 2010), housing supply is assumed to be fixed and normalized to
1. The housing can be used as either living space for households or production space
for entrepreneurs. Households get utility from housing since they use it as living space.
Entrepreneurs do not get any utility from housing but they earn rent from the housing
since they lend it to firms as an input for production.
Entrepreneurs solve following utility maximization problem:
max
ce,t,he,t,ke,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βte
(
c1−σe,t − 1
1− σ
)
subject to ce,t + qt (he,t − he,t−1) + kt − (1− δ)kt−1 +Rt−1be,t−1
= be,t + r
k
t kt−1 + r
h
t qthe,t−1, (3.10)
Rtbe,t ≤ m
h
eEt (qt+1he,t) +m
k
ekt, (3.11)
where βe is discount factor of entrepreneurs, m
k
e and m
h
e are LTV ratios against capital
and housing respectively, and δ is depreciation rate for capital.
Equation (3.11) captures the idea of collateral constraint which entrepreneurs face.
Total repayment of debt, Rtbe,t, at next period should be less (0 < m
k
e ,m
h
e < 1) than
the expected next period value of collaterals, Et (qt+1he,t) + kt.
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Entrepreneurs first order conditions are given by:
c−σe,t = λe,tRt + βeEt
(
Rtc
−σ
e,t+1
)
, (3.12)
c−σe,t = λe,tm
k
e + βeEt
{[
rkt+1 + (1− δ)
]
c−σe,t+1
}
, (3.13)
qtc
−σ
e,t = λe,tm
h
eEt (qt+1) + βeEt
{[
qt+1
(
1 + rht+1
)]
c−σe,t+1
}
, (3.14)
where λe,t denotes a Lagrangian multiplier for collateral constraint.
3.2.4 Firms
Firms are perfect competitive. They use capital, kt, labor, lp,t, ls,t, and housing, he,t
as inputs to produce consumption goods, yt, and pay r
k
t , r
h
t qt, wp,t, ws,t for the use of
inputs repectively. We assume firms’ production technology is Cobb-Douglass5.
A representative firm solve following profit maximization problem:
max
kt−1,he,t−1,lp,t,le,t
yt −
(
wp,tlp,t +ws,tls,t + r
k
t kt−1 + r
h
t qthe,t−1
)
subject to yt = atk
µ
t−1h
ν
e,t−1l
α(1−µ−ν)
p,t l
(1−α)(1−µ−ν)
s,t (3.15)
where µ, ν, and 1−µ−ν denote capital, housing, and labor share of output respectively,
at is exogenous technology shock.
We assume patient households take α and subprimers take (1 − α) from the labor
share of output, 1− µ− ν. So we can say that higher α implies higher share of patient
households in total households.
A representative firm’s first order conditions are given by:
µ
yt
kt−1
= rkt , (3.16)
ν
yt
he,t−1
= rht qt, (3.17)
α(1 − µ− ν)
yt
lp,t
= wp,t, (3.18)
(1− α)(1 − µ− ν)
yt
ls,t
= ws,t. (3.19)
5For simplicity, we assume labors of patient households and subprimers are not substitutes
but complements.
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3.2.5 Market Clearing Conditions
We assume the amount of housing is fixed and normalized to 1. It implies no hous-
ing production and no depreciation on housing. So we have following housing market
clearing condition:
hp,t + hs,t + he,t = 1. (3.20)
Patient households’ saving should be equal to the sum of loans to subprimers and
entrepreneurs. So loan market clearing condition is given by:
bp,t = bs,t + be,t. (3.21)
Aggregate resource constraint is as follows:
yt = cp,t + cs,t + ce,t + kt − (1− δ)kt−1. (3.22)
3.2.6 Shock Processes
Technology shock and volatility shock follow AR(1) process as follows.
ln at = (1− ρa) ln a¯+ ρa ln at−1 + vt−1ǫ
a
t , (3.23)
ln vt = (1− ρv) ln v¯ + ρv ln vt−1 + σvǫ
v
t , (3.24)
where ρa and ρv are parameters of persistency for each shock, a¯ and v¯ are steady state
value of at and vt, ǫ
a
t and ǫ
v
t are white noise with mean 0 and standard deviation 1, σv
is standard deviation of volatility shock and constant. From the equation (3.23) and
(3.24), we know that the standard deviation of ln at is vt−1 which is time varying.
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3.2.7 Solution Method
Introducing time varying volatility into DSGE model is not trivial. BFJ (2010)
and GSJ (2010) use VFI (Value Function Iteration) to identify the role of time-varying
volatility. However, as Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2010) [18] pointed,
VFI has ”curse of dimensionality” problem and might not be appropriate for the models
with imperfections and rigidities.
As an alternative, we can consider perturbation method. Fernandez-Villaverde et
al. (2009) [32] finds that in third-order approximation, volatility shock plays an inde-
pendent role. BB (2011) applies third-order approximation in their analysis using the
Perturbation AIM Algorithm and software developed by Swanson, Anderson, and Levin
(2006) [16]. Benigno, Benigno, and Nistico (2010 [23], 2011 [24]) shows that if exoge-
nous state variables follow conditionally linear stochastic processes, the second-order
approximation would be sufficient to get distinct role of time varying volatility shock.
In this paper, we use third-order approximation for the solution of the model to
identify the distinct role of time varying volatility. To get third-order policy function,
we use Dynare++ software, stand alone C++ based version of Dynare. In addition, we
cross check the result from Dynare++ with that from the method which BBN (2010)
suggests.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Calibration
For calibration, we basically follow BB (2011) for the parameters in exogenous shocks
and Iacoviello (2005, 2011) for other parameters. <Table 3.1> presents calibrated pa-
rameters.
Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter Value Description
βp 0.990 Discount factor of patient households
βs 0.980 Discount factor of subprimers
βe 0.980 Discount factor of entrepreneurs
τ 0.650 Weight of labor in utility function
γ 0.025 Weight of housing in utility function
σ 1.500 Parameter for risk aversion
µ 0.300 Output share of capital
ν 0.033 Output share of housing
α 0.640 Income share of patient households
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
ms 0.900 Loan to value ratio for subprimers’ housing
mke 0.900 Loan to value ratio for entrepreneurs’ capital
mhe 0.900 Loan to value ratio for entrepreneurs’ housing
ρa 0.990 Technology shock persistence
ρv 0.830 Volatility shock persistence
a¯ 1.000 Steady state value of at
v¯ 0.010 Steady state value of vt
σv 0.420 Standard deviation of volatility shock
We set βp = 0.99 and βs = βe = 0.98
6 to satisfy the condition for binding constraint
(βp > βs, βe). For the parameters controlling leverage, we choose ms = m
k
e = m
h
e =
0.90 following Iacoviello (2011) [30]. Since we have different functional form in utility
function, we choose different parameters for weights on leisure and housing in utility
function. The weights on leisure in utility function, τ , is set at 0.65, this number yield
0.3 of weighted average of households labor in steady state. The weights of housing in
utility function is set at 0.025 which yields 2.1 of ratio of real estate wealth to output in
steady state as in Iacoviello (2011). For the share of patient households, α, we choose
0.64 as in Iacoviello (2005)7 since our model considers highly indebted economy. The
6Iacoviello (2005, 2011) have slightly different numbers each other. In 2005, βp = 0.99,
βs = 0.95, and βe = 0.98. In 2011, βp = 0.9925, βs = 0.96, and βe = 0.96.
7In Iacoviello (2011), α = 0.70.
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shares of capital and housing to output are set 0.30 and 0.0338 to make generally used
share of labor to output be 0.667. As baseline risk-aversion, we use σ = 1.5 since
although it shortly disappears, we have slight increase in investment at the impact of
uncertainty shock at σ = 2.0 which is generally used. Regarding calibration of exogenous
shock, various numbers are suggested by various researchers because the volatility shock
process is not well known yet. So we use the calibration which BB (2011) suggests:
ρa = 0.99, ρv = 0.83, v¯ = σa = 0.01, σv = 0.42.
3.3.2 Impulse Response (Technology Volatility Shock Only)
From the impulse responses, <Figure 3.2> to <Figure 3.5>, to one standard devi-
ation shock in technology volatility, we finds that uncertainty shock has negative effect
on key macro variables. In contrast to the result of standard RBC model, investment,
labor, and output goes down with consumption by uncertainty shock. Under higher risk
aversion, investment slightly increases at the impact of the shock but shortly goes down
below its steady state level. Our model also predicts negative effect on housing price
and size of loan by uncertainty shock.
Figure 3.2: Uncertainty Shock under Various Risk Aversion
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8In Iacoviello (2011) [30], µ = 0.35 and ν = 0.05.
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Figure 3.3: Uncertainty Shock under Various Risk Aversion
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Figure 3.4: Uncertainty Shock under Various Risk Aversion
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Figure 3.5: Uncertainty Shock under Various Risk Aversion
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The co-movement among key macro variables do not come from price stickiness,
adjustment cost in production inputs, idiosyncratic shocks to heterogenous firms, or
disaster shock. However, housing price plays an important role in the propagation
of uncertainty shock through collateral constraint channel. Uncertainty shock forces
borrowers to sell housing to avoid uncertainty in future consumption. It leads to drop
in housing price. The lowered housing price causes credit crunch in subprimers and
entrepreneurs through collateral constraint channel, which makes decreases in aggregate
consumption and investment.
Patient households buy housing at lowered price by reducing loans to borrowers.
Impatient households sell housing to reduce uncertainty in future consumption. En-
trepreneurs also reduce housing but it is not sufficient to maintain previous level of
consumption. Although both households still have precautionary motive to work more,
lowered labor demand by firms and increased in housing (patient households) and con-
sumption (impatient households) lowers hours to work in equilibrium.
We finds that the role of risk aversion under uncertainty shock is almost canceled
out by collateral constraint channel. In RBC model, higher risk aversion leads more
investment and labor so more output. However, by introducing collateral constraint
channel, under higher risk aversion, consumption drops more but investment and labor
increases less. As a result, output decreases more under higher risk aversion. This result
74
comes from the sensitivity of housing price to the risk aversion under uncertainty shock.
Under higher risk aversion, borrowers sell more portion of their housing. It leads to
more drop in housing price. Although stronger precautionary motive increases labor and
investment by reducing consumption, collateral constraint channel significantly dampens
the increase in investment and labor but strengthens decrease in consumption.
We also check the impulse responses of volatility shock under various LTVs. The
result shows that the level of indebtedness of borrowers plays an important role in the
propagation of uncertainty shock. Higher indebted borrowers sell more portion of their
housing so housing price drops more up to mid term in the higher indebted economy.
However, the effects on consumption and investment are mixed. Consumption decreases
more but investment decreases less although the consumption channel dominates the
investment channel. As a result, output decreases more in the economy with higher
indebted borrowers under uncertainty shock.
Figure 3.6: Uncertainty Shock under Various LTVs
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Figure 3.7: Uncertainty Shock under Various LTVs
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Figure 3.8: Uncertainty Shock under Various LTVs
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Figure 3.9: Uncertainty Shock under Various LTVs
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Regarding quantitative magnitude, we finds that the effect of technology volatility
shock is very small. In our base line calibration (σ = 1.5 and LTV = 0.90), one standard
deviation technology uncertainty shock generates only 0.007 percentage points drop in
GDP at a peak. When LTV = 0.95, we still have only 0.016 percentage points drop in
GDP at a peak. BB (2011) also finds that the technology volatility shock generates a
peak drop in output of 0.02 percentage points. Although the magnitude of the effect is
very small, our model can generate opposite direction of impulse responses. In standard
RBC model, same technology volatility shock produces 0.004 percentage points increase
in output at a peak.
3.3.3 Impulse Response (Technology Level and Volatility Shocks)
Uncertainty tends to increase when external shock hits the economy regardless of
the sign of the external shock. <figure 3.10> and <figure 3.11> present the impulse
responses of variables to the simultaneous positive one standard deviation shocks of
technology level and volatility in RBC model and our extended model respectively.
When we consider the case in which technology volatility shock works together with
technology level shock, we should note that the volatility shock affects the model not
only in the third order term but also in the second order terms.
In RBC model, the positive technology volatility shock amplifies the effect of the
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Figure 3.10: RBC Model: Technology Shock vs Technology + Volatility Shock
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positive technology level shock since the volatility shock tends to have positive effect on
GDP in RBC model.
Figure 3.11: Our Model: Technology Shock vs Technology + Volatility Shock
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In contrast, the effect of the positive technology level shock will be dampen by
the positive technology volatility shock since the volatility shock has negative effect on
GDP in our extended model. Interestingly, the statement will be opposite in the case
of the negative technology level shock. In RBC model, the effect of negative technology
level shock will be dampen because of same reasoning. In the contrary, the positive
technology volatility shock will amplify the effect of the negative technology level shock
in our extended model.
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3.4 Conclusion
We introduce time varying volatility shock in technology into a DSGE model with
collateral constrained borrowers. Under uncertainty shock, borrowers sell housing to
avoid uncertainty in future consumption and the decrease in housing demand leads to
drop in housing price. Lowered housing price plays an important role in the propaga-
tion of uncertainty shock through collateral constraint channel. By decreasing supply of
liquidity, collateral constraint channel causes simultaneous drop in aggregate consump-
tion, investment, and output. Under higher risk aversion or higher LTVs, the collateral
constraint channel is strengthened and has more negative effects on consumption and
output under volatility shock. Although investment increases at first under higher risk
aversion or higher LTVs, it shortly goes down below its steady state level.
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Appendix
Chapter 1. Appendix
Solving for Steady State Lending Rates:
The steady state equations of domestic and foreign patient HHs’ FOCs for deposits
give the deposit rates: Rd =
1
βp
and R∗d =
1
β∗p
. Foreign banks’ steady state FOCS for
deposits and loans can be written as:
1− β∗bR
∗
d = λ
′∗
b
1− β∗bR
∗
i = λ
′∗
b γ
∗
i
1− β∗bR
∗
e = λ
′∗
b γ
∗
e
1− β∗bRf = λ
′∗
b γ
∗
f
where λ′∗b is the multiplier on foreign banks capital requirement constraint, multiplied
by foreign bankers’ consumption, i.e., λ′∗b = λ
∗
bc
∗
b,t. Simple algebra, replacing λ
′∗
b with
(1 − β∗bR
∗
d), then yield the foreign banks’ lending rates. Domestic banks steady state
FOCs for deposits and loans are:
1− βbRd = λ
′
b + λ
′
fmf
1− βbRi = λ
′
bγi + λ
′
fmf
1− βbRe = λ
′
bγe + λ
′
fmf
1− βbRf = λ
′
b + λ
′
fRf
From the first and the last equation of the above system of four equations, one can
solve for the value of λf :
λ′f =
βb(Rd−Rf )
Rf−mf
The bottom of the equation is greater than 0, since Rf > 1 > mf . Thus, λf > 0
when Rd > Rf . Combine the above system of equations to solve for domestic lending
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rates, we have
Rf −Rd
Ri −Rd
=
λ′f (mf −Rf )
λ′b(1− γi)
Rf −Rd
Ri −Rd
=
λ′f (mf −Rf )
(1− βbRd − λ
′
fmf )(1 − γi)
= −δ1
Ri = Rd +
1
δ1
(Rd −Rf )
Rf −Rd
Re −Rd
=
λ′f (mf −Rf )
λ′b(1− γe)
Rf −Rd
Re −Rd
=
λ′f (mf −Rf )
(1− βbRd − λ
′
fmf )(1 − γe)
= −δ2
Re = Rd +
1
δ2
(Rd −Rf )
All deposit and lending rate in the table are now determined.
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Chapter 2. Appendix
Subprimers’ Budget Constraint:
We assume subprimers with outstanding loan lose collateral if they lose job and go
default. Then, we can write subprimers’ budget as follows:
cs,t + qt(hs,t − hs,t−1) + n
φ
s,tRs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1 + (1− n
φ
s,t)n
χ
s,t−1qths,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(*): losing collateral
= nχs,tbs,t + ns,tws,tls,t + t1.
Under this budget constraint, subprimers would consider the effect of unemployment
when they buy house. To make subprimers consider the effect of unemployment when
they borrow, we need to rewrite (*) in terms of borrowing instead of collateral.
Since collateral constraint always binds, we can write the current value of housing
in terms of borrowing as follows:
Rs,t−1bs,t−1 = msEt−1 (qths,t−1)
⇒ Et−1 (qths,t−1) =
1
ms
Rs,t−1bs,t−1
⇒ Et−1 (qt) hs,t−1 =
1
ms
Rs,t−1bs,t−1
⇒ hs,t−1 =
1
ms
1
Et−1 (qt)
Rs,t−1bs,t−1
⇒ qths,t−1 =
1
ms
qt
qet
Rs,t−1bs,t−1. (**)
Plug (**) into the above budget constraint, we get equation (4):
cs,t + qt(hs,t − hs,t−1) + n
φ
s,tRs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1 + (1− n
φ
s,t)n
χ
s,t−1qths,t−1
= nχs,tbs,t + ns,tws,tls,t + tt
⇒ cs,t + qt(hs,t − hs,t−1) + n
φ
s,tRs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1 + (1− n
φ
s,t)n
χ
s,t−1
1
ms
qt
qet
Rs,t−1bs,t−1
= nχs,tbs,t + ns,tws,tls,t + tt
⇒ cs,t + qt(hs,t − hs,t−1) +
[
nφs,t + (1− n
φ
s,t)
1
ms
qt
qet
]
nχs,t−1Rs,t−1bs,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Repayment of Loan
= nχs,tbs,t + ns,tws,tls,t + tt.
Now subprimers consider the effect of unemployment when they borrow. If they are
employed, they would successfully pay back loan. Otherwise, they would lose the value
of collateral.
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Subprimers’ Surplus from Marginal Matching:
Given ns,t+1 = (1 − ϕ)ns,t + f(γs,t)(1 − ns,t), subprimers solve following recursive
form utility maximization problem:
W (ns,t, ns,t−1) = arg max ln cs,t + jt lnhs,t + ns,tτ ln(1− ls,t) + (1− ns,t) ln(1− e)
+ µs,t(∗) + λs,t(∗∗) + βiEt [W (ns,t+1, ns,t)]
where µs,t and λs,t are the Lagrangian multipliers for budget constraint and collateral
constraint, * and ** are budget constraint and collateral constraint as follows:
∗ = nχs,tbs,t + ns,tws,tls,t − cs,t − qt(hs,t − hs,t−1)
−
{
nφs,t + (1− n
φ
s,t)
1
ms
qt
qet
}
Rs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1,
∗∗ = msEt(qt+1hs,t)−Rs,tbs,t.
Note that subprimers’ value function, W (ns,t, ns,t−1), depends on ns,t−1 as well as
ns,t since outstanding loan is determined by last period employment. We should consider
that when we differentiate the value function with respect to ns,t.
∂W (ns,t, ns,t−1)
∂ns,t
= W1(ns,t, ns,t−1),
∂W (ns,t+1, ns,t)
∂ns,t
= Et
[
∂W (ns,t+1, ns,t)
∂ns,t+1
∂ns,t+1
∂ns,t
+
∂W (ns,t+1, ns,t)
∂ns,t
|ns,t+1
]
= Et
{
W1(ns,t+1, ns,t) [(1− ϕ)− f(γs,t)]− µs,t+1
[
nφs,t+1 + (1− n
φ
s,t+1)
1
ms
]
Rs,tbs,tχn
χ−1
s,t
}
.
By Envelope theorem, we could find subprimers surplus from marginal matching:
W1(ns,t, ns,t−1)
= τ ln(1− ls,t)− τ ln(1− e)
+ µs,t
[
χnχ−1s,t bs,t +ws,tls,t − φn
φ−1
s,t
(
1−
1
ms
qt
qet
)
Rs,t−1n
χ
s,t−1bs,t−1
]
+ Et
{
W1(ns,t+1, ns,t) [(1− ϕ)− f(γs,t)]− µs,t+1
[
nφs,t+1 + (1− n
φ
s,t+1)
1
ms
]
Rs,tbs,tχn
χ−1
s,t
}
.
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